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Issue notes—Special Committee on Canada-China Relations: National Security Dimension of the Canada-China Relationship (February 25, 2021)
Import prohibition on goods produced by forced labour
Proposed response
The Government of Canada is committed to upholding human rights and international labour standards.
Generally speaking, all goods entering Canada, including shipments from China, may be subject to a more in-depth secondary examination. The CBSA uses a risk management approach to determine which goods entering Canada require a secondary examination.
Goods that are mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour, are prohibited from entering Canada. The CBSA prohibits such goods from entering Canada when it has sufficient evidence to do so.
Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is the Government of Canada's lead department for labour-related programs, and the CBSA works closely with ESDC to identify goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada.
Background
Canada has imposed an importation ban on goods that were produced by forced labour, as described in An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States, which received Royal Assent on . As described in paragraph 202(8), Chapter 98 item No. 9897.00.00 of the Customs Tariff, the law has been amended to include a reference prohibiting goods mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour. These amendments made under the Act came into force in Canada on , as outlined in CBSA Customs Notice 20-23, Import prohibition on goods produced wholly or in part by forced labour.
Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is the Government of Canada's lead department for labour-related programs and the CBSA works closely with ESDC to identify goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada. ESDC's Labour Program is actively monitoring and researching evidence related to problematic supply chains, and documented evidence of goods being produced with forced labour is transmitted for CBSA's consideration. The CBSA conducts risk analyses on goods entering the country to determine if they are admissible. The CBSA may use this information to identify and intercept shipments containing goods that have been identified as suspected to have been produced by forced labour.
Shipments containing goods suspected of being produced by forced labour will be detained at the border for inspection by a border services officer. If in the judgement of the officer the goods were produced by forced labour, the officer will apply the tariff classification under chapter 9897 and prohibit the goods from entering Canada. Determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, based on available supporting evidence and analysis. Importers of goods classified under tariff item No. 9897.00.00 may appeal the classification as prohibited, re-export the goods or abandon the goods.
The Customs Tariff import prohibition is the only legislative enforcement tool in Canadian law regarding the importation of goods produced by forced labour.
In addition, the Customs Tariff can not be used to prohibit the importation of goods solely on the basis of originating from a specific country or region. Implementing such restrictions would fall under the purview of Global Affairs Canada.
Importers are encouraged to work with their foreign suppliers to ensure that any goods imported into Canada have not been mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced or compulsory labour.
The Government of Canada expects companies to take every step possible to ensure that their supply chains conform to Canadian law with respect to the prohibition on the import of forced labour. It is the responsibility of the importing company to conduct due diligence on its supply chains to ensure that it is not directly or indirectly sourcing products from entities implicated in forced labour or other human rights violations.
Border security contracts (Nuctech)
Proposed response
The safety and security of Canada is a top priority for the CBSA.
The CBSA has fulfilled its contractual obligations with Nuctech.
We can confirm that these devices are not connected to the CBSA networks as they are stand-alone systems and isolated from Government of Canada networks.
Any new procurements will be conducted under new contract security guidelines which will ensure that detection equipment at the port of entry are subject to higher security considerations.
Decisions to award contracts undergo a thorough review and are made in accordance with established Government of Canada guidelines.
If pressed
Public Service and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is the contracting authority for the Government of Canada.
The CBSA works closely with PSPC on large contracts and relies on their expertise to address any security risks related to those contracting activities. These security assessments are undertaken by PSPC's Industrial Security Program.
A standard security Requirements Checklist is completed for contracts, outlining any specific security requirements.
Supplier's staff, who undertake the installation or maintenance activities required in the contracts, are security-cleared by the Agency prior to being allowed access to CBSA facilities and they are escorted.
If pressed on the supply chain integrity assessment by Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
While this equipment is not connected to any internal networking systems, to ensure the integrity of the equipment, the CBSA did request an assessment by CSE be completed when it became aware of possible concerns.
The assessment was only one aspect of CBSA's overall review, which helped to inform CBSA of any associated risks and apply appropriate mitigations with regards to the supply chain integrity.
Background
On , Global News published an article, noting that Nuctech had been awarded four border security and customs warehouse contracts to provide scanners and lab equipment to the CBSA. On , Global News published another article, referencing the same four contracts.
The CBSA currently has four fulfilled procurement contracts for the acquisition of detection technology with Nuctech - the earliest of which commenced in the fall of 2017, and the latest fulfilled in fall of 2020. Five Pallet Large Scale Imaging (LSI) systems were also scheduled to be purchased under the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV), and installed at major air cargo centers across the country.
The latest contract for the Mobile LSI was fulfilled in . After conducting performance and usability tests, the unit was planned to be deployed to a land border. If successful, this product was to replace the current fleet of aging Mobile LSIs; however, the CBSA has not deployed this equipment.
All of these devices are standalone devices, not directly connected to the CBSA or Government of Canada (GoC) networks. Images and information are stored directly on the devices themselves, with an over-writing function once the hard-drive fills up. It is suggested that this is about every 30 days. The devices had previously been serviced between one to two times per year (which would include any maintenance and updates) by an employee/engineer from the Nuctech, who requires escort while on CBSA premises. Each contract would have a two year warranty covering preventative maintenance (1 to 2 times per year) as well as servicing for any issues. After this, there would be options within the contract to extend the maintenance/servicing.
The typical lifecycle for these devices is approximately eight years; however, given the sensitive role that detection technology plays at the border and for the security of Canada, as well as PSPC's recent classification of detection technology at the border as a sensitive sector, the CBSA is currently reviewing all of its detection technology and future procurements.
The CBSA works with PSPC's specialist Industrial Security Program to address any security risks related to the contracting activities. The work involved in clearing Nuctech Co. Ltd, as well as any particular supplier, is done by PSPC's Industrial Security Program. The CBSA, as a client of PSPC, provides the requirements for the contract, as it would for any other contract, in the Statement of Work. Once the vendor has been cleared and the contract is awarded by PSPC, the CBSA is responsible for security screening of any contractors who require unrestricted access to CBSA's premises or information.
The details of the CBSA's four fulfilled contracts with Nuctech are as follows:
- Contract A (value $2.54 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of a Pallet / Large Scale Imaging System – this has been installed and is used to X-ray palletized goods
- Contract B (value $1.01 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of [Redacted] Warehouse X-Ray Systems – these have been installed in a number of facilities across Canada and are used to X-ray commercial goods
- Contract C (value $0.48 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of [Redacted] Low Conveyor X-Ray Systems – these have been installed in a number of facilities across Canada and are used to X-ray passenger baggage in secondary operations
- Contract D (value $4.00 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of a Mobile Large Scale Imaging System
Key messages
Additional speaking points
As soon as the CBSA became aware of the concerns surrounding Nuctech imaging equipment, on , it began a review of its own contracts, procurement, and imaging equipment.
Only a small portion of our overall CBSA suite of detection technology is Nuctech manufactured equipment.
Our review did not identify any security breaches or incidents of concern with our x-ray detection equipment.
We have also implemented a number of risk mitigation measures in this space.
I can also confirm that the Nuctech equipment does not handle classified, sensitive or personalized material, and is not directly connected to CBSA or Government of Canada networks. These are stand-alone devices, used for a very specific purpose at various Ports of Entry.
We have not identified any risk to Canada or Canadians through the deployment of this equipment.
Anytime non-CBSA personnel are required to come to a CBSA Port of Entry or facility for delivery, installation or maintenance of equipment, they are screened, escorted and monitored to ensure the integrity of our facilities and programs, and the safety and security of our operations.
The four procurement processes that resulted in contracts with Nuctech were conducted in accordance with Government of Canada guidelines.
All were open competitive processes wherein the vendor objectively scored the highest with respect to technical merit (as per the requirements set out in the Request for Proposal (RFP)) and price.
As the equipment procured would not be handling sensitive or personalized material or information, and/or be directly connected to any CBSA or Government of Canada networks, the RFPs were not limited to Canadian firms.
All RFPs were carried out in accordance with Canada's commitments under its trade agreements.
We take the role of detection equipment at the border, and the role it plays in national security and public safety, very seriously. That is why we have been working with our security, intelligence, procurement and public safety partners to review our processes for procurement of all detection equipment to be used at the border. We will be applying even more scrutiny in future procurement.
I want to assure you that the CBSA has taken steps to identify and mitigate any risks posed by these and other procurement processes.
We have robust intelligence and departmental security programs. We are working closely with our partners in the Government of Canada Security and Intelligence Community, and will continuously monitor and review our own processes and activities in all aspects of our operations.
Wanzhou Meng case
Proposed response
I cannot speak to the specifics of this case as it is currently before the courts. The extradition proceedings are currently before the Supreme Court of British Colombia.
All persons, including Canadian citizens, seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and may be subject to a more in-depth exam. The CBSA has policies and procedures that it follows for all secondary examinations to determine the admissibility of people and goods into Canada.
Background
Ms. Meng arrived off a Cathay flight from Hong Kong on . She was met by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers who had been notified of a provisional arrest warrant for her extradition to the United States for fraud (over $5,000), issued on by the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The CBSA advised Ms. Meng that her customs examination was concluded and she was released to the care and control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who then arrested her for the purposes of extradition. On , the CBSA issued a warrant for the continuation of her examination and determination of admissibility to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). At no point during this process was Ms. Meng detained by the CBSA. The CBSA followed its policies and procedures for secondary examination to determine the admissibility of people and goods into Canada.
Ms. Meng's bail hearing under the extradition process concluded on and she was ordered released on various conditions, including a $10 million bond. At the time of her release, the CBSA executed its warrant, releasing her on conditions and deferring her examination until enough evidence is gathered to make an admissibility determination under IRPA.
On , the Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed in Ms. Meng's extradition matter, formally commencing her extradition process. The same day, Ms. Meng filed a civil action against the CBSA, the RCMP and their officers seeking an unspecified amount of damages for breaching her section 7, 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights and unlawfully detaining her at the Vancouver International Airport. She is alleging that RCMP officers and/or representatives of the United States Department of Justice arranged for the CBSA to delay the immediate execution of the arrest warrant in order to obtain evidence and information from Ms. Meng, including the examination of her baggage and electronic devices, under the guise of a routine border check.
On , the CBSA filed its Statement of Defense.
The Government of Canada disclosure of relevant documents in the civil action was made on .
In her separate extradition proceedings United States v. Meng, a disclosure motion filed by Ms. Meng was argued before the Supreme Court of British Colombia between and . This motion was brought in order to seek further disclosure of documents (more than would normally be permitted in such a matter) from the Government of Canada.
The motion was made in furtherance of an abuse of process motion brought by Ms. Meng's counsel. On , the court ruled that Ms. Meng had met the legal test for disclosure and made an Order for further document production.
The Government of Canada disclosed the relevant documents in the extradition proceedings in . The Government of Canada filed motions under s.37 and s.38 of the Canada Evidence Act to protect sensitive information, which the court upheld on and .
As part of the abuse of process allegations in the extradition proceedings, CBSA and RCMP officers testified for approximately four weeks from October to . The four weeks were spread out during three months due to the scheduling availability of the court and the testimony taking longer than anticipated.
On , Ms. Meng applied to the court to amend her bail conditions, which the court denied on .
Ms. Meng has filed her submissions relating to the abuse of process allegations in the extradition proceedings on . The Government of Canada's are due on and the hearing is set to take place from until .
Opioids / Illicit narcotics
Proposed response
Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with illegal substances, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, continues to be a priority for the Government of Canada.
Since , the opioid overdose crisis has claimed the lives of more than 17,600 Canadians and continues to represent a significant and ongoing public health emergency.
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the opioid crisis, leading to a reported increase in opioid-related deaths and substance use harms in 2020.
Canada's response to the opioid crisis, and problematic substance use in general, balances public health and safety considerations, and emphasizes the importance of demand and supply reduction measures as encompassed in the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy.
Public Safety Canada, together with its portfolio partners, is actively working to support law enforcement in reducing the supply of illegal substances, including synthetic opioids like fentanyl, which are a key driver of this crisis.
We know that many of these substances, and increasingly, the chemicals used to manufacture them, come from China and surrounding areas and that demand for them remains high.
As such, cooperation with Chinese authorities is important to effectively disrupt the importation of, and trafficking in, these substances.
As a result of international pressure, in , China implemented more stringent controls on fentanyl and its analogues.
Public Safety Canada continues to monitor emerging trends in the illicit drug market and engage with its portfolio and international partners to advance supply reduction policies to mitigate the harms posed by these substances.
If pressed on what the Canada Border Services Agency is doing to stop these substances from entering Canada
CBSA is aware of the threat that fentanyl, its analogues and precursors pose and uses a variety of detection tools, techniques, and the latest scientific technology to interdict illicit drugs at the border.
In recent years, the Government of Canada has invested in increased capacity at the CBSA to interdict illicit substances, including the training and deployment of six additional detector dog teams and equipping ports of entry for the safe examination of highly toxic substances.
With China's stricter controls on fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, synthetic alternatives and non-scheduled precursor chemicals are now being imported to meet expanding Canadian demand.
In collaboration with its government partners, the CBSA continues to ensure that adequate controls are in place to combat the smuggling of toxic substances and decrease the risk of harmful opioids going undetected and entering Canada.
If pressed on recent Canada Border Services Agency seizures of fentanyl
Between and , the CBSA has performed 2,246 opioid seizures from global sources, totaling over 2,829 kilograms.
In 2020, seizures included:
- 5.8 kilograms of fentanyl, an increase of 1,662% compared to 2019 and representing a potential 2.9 million lethal doses
- 1,158 kilograms of cocaine (an 18% decrease compared to 2019)
- 788 kilograms of methamphetamine (a 46% increase compared to 2019)
- 659 kilograms of opium (a 109% increase compared to 2019)
- 92 kilograms of heroin (no change compared to 2019)
These results can be directly attributed to improved targeting, intelligence, and deployment of additional enforcement resources.
If pressed on RCMP-China collaboration on investigations related to fentanyl
China remains a source country for fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and increasingly, precursor chemicals flowing to Canada.
The RCMP has been working with Chinese authorities to investigate and disrupt the illegal export of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and precursor chemicals to Canada.
Through these efforts, China has become a key partner in combatting fentanyl trafficking and Canada appreciates China's domestic efforts to improve its fentanyl scheduling regime.
[Redacted]
Background
With more than 17,600 opioid-related deaths since , the opioid overdose crisis is a national public health and safety epidemic of significant concern to the Government of Canada. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the opioid crisis. Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are responsible for a significant portion of opioid toxicity deaths.
Supply trends
Fentanyl seizures by Canadian law enforcement have been increasing since 2011. Since 2016, China has been a significant exporter of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues to Canada. Today, fentanyl powders continue to be ordered on the Internet and smuggled into Canada [Redacted] however, precursor and pre-precursor chemical imports [Redacted] are displacing the ready-made fentanyl threat and contributing to domestic production of fentanyl.
China has been responsive to international requests to schedule fentanyl and related substances. In , China scheduled fentanyl and its analogues as controlled substances. Since China implemented these controls, CBSA has recorded only one fentanyl seizure from China. In 2020, CBSA made fewer seizures of fentanyl from global sources (down by 42% with 13 seizures in 2020), but seized larger quantities of fentanyl (up by 1,662%) relative to 2019. Import of precursor chemicals has been increasing since 2018.
[Redacted]
Ultimately, the emergence of new countries as source and transit points for fentanyl and various analogues could signal the beginning of a diversification of routings as traffickers attempt to evade law enforcement efforts aimed at China. [Redacted]
Federal action
To further assist health, law enforcement and border officials in addressing the opioid overdose crisis, the Government of Canada has amended several Acts to, for example, restrict the importation of pill presses and other devices used to produce pills containing illegal opioids and to allow border officers greater authority to interdict controlled substances in international mail.
The Public Safety Portfolio continues to monitor emerging trends in the illicit drug market and is engaging with its domestic and international partners to advance supply reduction efforts. To this end, the RCMP has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security that facilitates joint work on, inter alia, illicit drug trafficking. [Redacted]
Other federal actions include the creation of the Organized Crime Joint Operations Centre (OC JOC) between RCMP, CBSA [Redacted] to coordinate operational responses to address the illicit drug problem; the National Chemical Precursor Diversion Program to prevent the flow of precursors from legitimate industry to drug traffickers; and, the RCMP's Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response team to assist other police services to combat drug threats.
Removals: Cases with criminality
Proposed response
The CBSA places the highest priority on removal cases involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminals.
If a foreign national or a permanent resident commits a crime in Canada, they must complete their sentence through Canada's judicial system before a removal can take place.
Once individuals have exhausted all legal avenues of appeal and/or due process, they are expected to respect our laws and leave Canada, or be removed by the CBSA.
Should a foreign national be deemed inadmissible and is considered to be a danger to the public, they may be detained in immigration detention until their removal is conducted.
It's important to note that detention is an essential tool to support the removal of inadmissible persons from Canada. The primary objective of detention is to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society.
Furthermore, individuals that pose a danger to the public or are considered a flight risk may be escorted to their final destination.
Serious inadmissibility cases represent 2% of the overall removal working inventory with 35 cases out of 1,866. Of these, three (3) cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for removal.
Background
One of the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) key mandated objectives is to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society. These objectives are found in both the CBSA Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
The CBSA places the highest priority on cases involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminals. Individuals believed to be inadmissible to Canada for safety and security reasons will have an inadmissibility report written against them. Depending on the particular inadmissibility, a decision as to whether or not to issue a removal order will be made by a reviewing officer acting under the delegated authority of the Minister, or by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). If there is sufficient evidence to support the inadmissibility allegation, a deportation order will be issued against the person concerned.
Not all inadmissibility reports result in a removal order. If the reviewing officer or the IRB determines that the evidence presented is not sufficient to support the allegation, a deportation order will not be issued. To ensure consistency in reporting on safety and security cases, the Agency reports on cases that have completed the entire process and are found inadmissible on safety and security grounds
It is important to note that the Agency closely monitors the progress of any cases flagged as having evidence on file that could potentially lead to a serious inadmissibility. If a removal order is issued, the agency will monitor the progress until all legal avenues of appeal and due process are exhausted, and commence removal preparations as quickly as possible. If a Foreign National is considered a danger to the public, they may be detained in immigration detention during the removal process.
Individuals subject to a deportation order for a serious inadmissibility may be eligible to a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) prior to removal. For those who are serving a term of imprisonment, the CBSA will initiate PRRA while the individual is serving their term of imprisonment to ensure that all due processes are completed before the term is completed. The removal may occur unescorted or under escort if it is required by the airline, the transit country or if the person poses a danger to the public or is a significant flight risk. Once removed, the deportation order bans the individual from Canada for life, unless they receive written permission to return to Canada.
| Fiscal years | Priority 1: Serious inadmissibility |
Priority 1: Irregular migrant Failed refugee claimant |
Priority 2: Refugee claimants |
Priority 3: Other inadmissibilities |
Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 to 2015 | 1,200 | not applicable | 6,704 | 4,029 | 11,933 |
| 2015 to 2016 | 969 | not applicable | 4,106 | 3,617 | 8,692 |
| 2016 to 2017 | 879 | not applicable | 4,182 | 2,937 | 7,998 |
| 2017 to 2018 | 903 | 139 | 4,033 | 3,137 | 8,212 |
| 2018 to 2019 | 931 | 436 | 4,633 | 3,698 | 9,698 |
| 2019 to 2020 | 1,026 | 548 | 6,318 | 3,644 | 11,536 |
| 2020 to 2021 (Up to ) |
391 | 174 | 8,561 | 822 | 9,948 |
| Total | 6,299 | 1,297 | 38,537 | 21,884 | 68,017 |
Serious inadmissibility cases represent 6% of the overall removal working inventory with 1,108 cases out of 18,818. Of these, 73 cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for removal.
| Fiscal years | Priority 1: Serious inadmissibility |
Priority 1: Irregular migrant Failed refugee claimant |
Priority 2: Refugee claimants |
Priority 3: Other inadmissibilities |
Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 to 2015 | 30 | not applicable | 244 | 198 | 472 |
| 2015 to 2016 | 29 | not applicable | 213 | 255 | 497 |
| 2016 to 2017 | 21 | not applicable | 179 | 206 | 406 |
| 2017 to 2018 | 36 | not applicable | 136 | 173 | 345 |
| 2018 to 2019 | 23 | 5 | 159 | 243 | 430 |
| 2019 to 2020 | 24 | 8 | 206 | 194 | 432 |
| 2020 to 2021 (Up to ) |
6 | not applicable | 117 | 42 | 165 |
| Total | 169 | 13 | 1,254 | 1,311 | 2,747 |
Serious inadmissibility cases represent 2% of the overall removal working inventory with 35 cases out of 1,866. Of these, 3 cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for their removal.
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