Overview: Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency—Invocation of the Emergencies Act (April 26, 2022)

Scenario note

General information

On March 24, 2022, the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency (DEDC) adopted a motion to invite the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, the President of the Queen's Privy Council and Minister of Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Public Safety, and the Minister of Justice to appear before the Committee at dates chosen by the Committee to discuss measures invoked on February 14, 2022 under the Emergencies Act (EA) for a period of 1.5 hour each, for a total of 6 hours. Ministers would be allotted five minutes for opening remarks, followed by 1.5 hour of questioning from members.

The Minister of Public Safety will appear before DEDC during the first half of their meeting on Tuesday, April 26, 2022, from 6:30 pm to 8:00 pm Deputy heads from Public Safety (PS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency (CSIS) will appear alongside the Minister.

During the second half of DEDC's meeting (from 8:00 pm to 9:30 pm), the Minister of Justice will appear alongside officials from the Department of Justice. The Minister of Public Safety and portfolio officials are only required to appear during the first half of DEDC's meeting.

Anticipated CBSA involvement

It is anticipated that the CBSA's role at DEDC will be minimal compared to the other organizations in attendance. The focus of the meeting and the large majority of the questions will likely be directed to the Minister, PS and RCMP. The last meeting pertaining to the invocation of the EA where CBSA was present took place on February 25, 2022 before the Standing Committee on National Security and Public Safety (SECU). During the SECU appearance, the CBSA only received one question from the NDP regarding Border Services Officers and the illegal border blockades.

Logistics

The meeting will take place on Tuesday, April 26, 2022, from 6:30 pm to 8:00 pm, and will be held in-person and via videoconference (Zoom platform). The Minister will attend in person. The Executive Vice-President will support the Minister virtually, and IT has confirmed they will be onsite to support him in the office. House of Commons technical staff will likely contact witnesses to run an A/V test the day of the meeting. All officials appearing at committee will need a wired headset with boom mic.

Opening remarks

At the beginning of the meeting, the Chair will invite the Minister to deliver five-minute opening remarks. Deputy heads from the portfolio agencies are not required to deliver opening remarks.

Rounds of questioning

At the Chair's discretion, questions from committee members will proceed as follows:

• First round: 4 minutes House of Commons Conservative, 4 minutes House of Commons Liberal, 4 minutes House of Commons Bloc Québécois (BQ), 4 minutes House of Commons New Democratic Party (NDP) and 4 minutes for each senator
• For the second and subsequent rounds: 3 minutes Conservative House of Commons, 3 minutes House of Commons Liberal, 2 minutes House of Commons BQ, 2 minutes House of Commons NDP and 2 minutes each for 2 senators on a rotational basis to be determined by the Senate parliamentary groups

Appearing

6:30 pm to 8:00 pm

Hon. Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety

Witnesses

6:30 pm to 8:00 pm

• Canada Border Services Agency
  Ted Gallivan, Executive Vice-President
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service
  David Vigneault, Director
• Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
  Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  Brenda Lucki, Commissioner

Key messages

1. The CBSA's management of operations at ports of entry (POEs)

We continually evaluated the situations at our different POEs to ensure protections were in place for the safety and security of the public and our employees, and to support the continuous flow of legitimate travel and trade. The CBSA remained ready to respond to any events that may have impeded operations at POEs in the future.

The public assemblies required the CBSA to mobilize and re-deploy its frontline resources at impacted POEs and at alternate processing sites.

CBSA regional management implemented contingency plans at POEs to ensure continuity in cross-border trade during the blockades and for border operations to return to normal as soon as blockades were lifted.
This included reinforcement of officer presence at POEs that saw a spike in traffic as a result of blockades at nearby POEs, particularly in the Manitoba area (resulting from Emerson blockade), Alberta (due to Coutts blockade) and Southern Ontario Region (due to Ambassador Bridge closure).

The CBSA also re-deployed officers as needed to alternate sites and within/across regions to ensure readiness and operational capacity to handle volume spikes and localized increases resulting from assembly activity and/or business resumption as the activity landscape evolved.

Assemblies at the major POEs at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, Ontario; Emerson, Manitoba; Coutts Alberta and Pacific Highway in British Columbia required the CBSA to suspend services.

In addition, there were 12 public assemblies that directly impacted POE operations. At two locations, Pacific Highway and Fort Erie, participants breached the confines of the CBSA plaza resulting in CBSA officers locking down the office to prevent intruders from gaining entry.

The CBSA continuously monitors its operations and is ready to respond, with police of local jurisdiction if necessary, to any events impeding operations at POEs.

Protection of critical infrastructure

The Emergency Measures Regulations enabled certain designated public places to be secured, including POEs, customs offices and other critical infrastructure and government buildings.

POEs are secure, controlled areas. It is an offence to hinder the ability of a BSO while they carry out their work.

The CBSA has a legal obligation to ensure the health and safety of its employees and persons under its care and control. The Agency also has an interest in protecting its facilities, in the interest of continuity of its service to the public. Should there be reason to believe that buildings or offices and travellers or employees are at risk of physical damage or harm, the CBSA will work closely with law enforcement partners to protect the integrity of its facilities and the safety of all people within.

2. The Emergency Measures Regulations provided the CBSA with necessary and essential authorities to manage the situation

The new authorities that supported CBSA management efforts at the border were the prohibition on entry by foreign nationals who were seeking to participate in prohibited public assemblies and resulted in automatic imposition of conditions requiring compliance with regulations made under the Emergencies Act on all temporary residents. Though the Emergency Measures Regulations did not give the CBSA new authorities with respect to goods, CBSA officers may have relied on their authorities under the Customs Act to detain goods while confirming with the police whether their importation was prohibited under the Criminal Code due to a contravention of the Emergency Measures Regulations.

New authorities

The CBSA exercised its authorities provided under the Emergency Measures Regulations and denied entry to two foreign nationals who were attempting to enter Canada to participate in prohibited public assemblies.

CBSA officers received instructions on administering the new regulations and may have refused entry to any foreign national seeking entry to Canada to participate in or facilitate a prohibited public assembly.

CBSA officers were not engaged in law enforcement activities that extended beyond their current authorities. Municipal by-laws, provincial regulations and breaking up the prohibited public assemblies were beyond these authorities.

As always, CBSA officers across the country continued to be vigilant to ensure that all requirements, including those in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Customs Act and Quarantine Act, were met and that anyone who was seeking to enter Canada was doing so for lawful reasons.

Impacts of repealing the Regulations

Since the Emergency Measures Regulations were repealed on February 23, the CBSA lost its authorities to deny access to otherwise admissible foreign nationals seeking entry to Canada to participate in prohibited public assemblies. Moreover, imported goods supporting such prohibited public assemblies were no longer be able to be detained at the border to ensure compliance with Criminal Code provisions related to the Emergency Measures Regulations.

3. Engagement with partners

The CBSA, with law enforcement partners and with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (U.S. CBP) at the local and regional levels, adjusted operations as the threat environment changed.

The CBSA embedded management representatives within the law enforcement incident command structure where activities were underway or where they were planned. The CBSA shared available intelligence with its partners and took the appropriate steps to enhance vigilance at POEs through increased examinations and physical security of offices.

The CBSA and U.S. CBP met daily at the operational level and senior management level to discuss the coordination of alternate ports/diversion/expanded hours of operations, the processing/facilitating of live animals and discuss roles and responsibilities at the border.

The CBSA engaged law enforcement partners at the highest risk POEs along the Canada/U.S. border. We established senior level coordination points with the police of jurisdiction and shared information concerning public assemblies which assisted in the development of operational plans to mitigate and respond to impacts to the border.

4. Impact of disruptions due to blockades

Trade and transportation within Canada and between Canada and the U.S. is highly integrated. Border crossings, railway lines, airports and other POEs are integrated and are adversely affected where one or more of the components is blockaded or prevented from operating under normal capacity.

The impact of the blockades on trade was broader than just re-directing commercial traffic to other POEs. When commercial vehicles were unable to access a POE, they redirected to another POE. Extended border wait times at alternate sites resulted in delays in delivering goods. The blockades impeded critical supply chains for essential goods, services and resources which were particularly harmful as the country worked to recover from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The blockades resulted in sustained disruptions to industry and threats to commercial trade. In addition to many disruptions of shorter duration, four key border crossings experienced multi-day closures: Ambassador Bridge, Coutts, Emerson and Pacific Highway.

Those four crossings together represent close to 45% of the volume of Canada's commercial imports by land POEs and half of the total value for duty nationally.

The closure of, and threats against, crucial POEs along the Canada-U.S. border not only had an adverse impact on Canada's economy, it also imperiled the welfare of Canadians by disrupting the transport of crucial goods such as medical supplies, food and fuel across the Canada-U.S. border.

This impacted law enforcement's ability to secure access routes to and from POEs, and to keep routes open to facilitate the processing and movement of goods and travellers.

Securing of trade corridors

The CBSA collaborates with police forces of jurisdiction and provincial/municipal officials to ensure the integrity of essential transportation and trade corridors.

This is achieved through effective traffic management, close monitoring by police and, if necessary, the temporary erection of physical barriers or other equipment to prevent vehicles from conducting an unlawful blockade.

The CBSA partnered with local officials to ensure that border traffic received priority until the threat to international trade subsided.

The enactment of the Emergencies Act provided authorities and powers to local law enforcement to clear the exit points of impacted POEs.

The clearance of the exit points at POEs resulted in the ability for the CBSA to recommence the processing of commercial traffic which reduced delays and the need to re-route traffic at impacted POEs.

Without the clearance of exit points, the delays, re-routing and backlogs would have continued.

Timeline of protest activity/Blockades at ports of entry
(February 7 to 19)

In the afternoon of February 14, 2022, the federal government declared a public order emergency.

The Emergency Measures Regulations and Emergency Economic Measures Order came into force around 6 pm on February 15, 2022.

Ports of entry

Ambassador

Service suspension: 20:59 ET - February 7, 2022
Service resumption: 00:11 ET - February 14, 2022

Disruption activity:

• January 30 to February 6: Convoys of vehicles ("slow roll" events) assembled on the highways near the port in opposition to the COVID-19 related mandates. The assemblies caused slowdowns and blockages of the highway, but traffic access to the port remained open
• February 7: The participants blocked all exits from the Ambassador Bridge; a Border Alert for service disruption was issued at 20:59 ET
• During the Ambassador Bridge closure, traveller traffic was directed to the Windsor-Detroit Tunnel, and commercial traffic was directed to Sarnia Blue Water Bridge
• February 14: Services resume (resumption message issued at 00:11 ET) after local police disperse the blockade. Individuals remain assembled in the area, but no operational impacts are reported

Coutts

Service suspension: 12:18 MT - February 12, 2022
Service resumption: 10:46 MT - February 15, 2022

Disruption activity:

• January 29 to February 3; February 7 to 12: Convoys of vehicles and individuals assembled on highways near the port in opposition to COVID-19 related mandates. The assemblies caused slowdowns and blockages of roadways, but traffic access to the port remained open
• February 7 to 12: Canada-bound vehicles were re-routed to alternate ports of entry at Carway, Del Bonita, and Rooseville (British Columbia) to avoid congestion near the border due to the ongoing assemblies
• February 11: RCMP requested that border services at Coutts be suspended for public safety considerations
• February 12: Border Alert for service disruption issued at 12:18 MT. Coutts POE closes to all traveller and commercial traffic
• February 15: Service resumes (resumption message issued at 10:46 MT). Individuals remain assembled at various points on the highway after this date, but RCMP presence is maintained and no operational impacts are reported

Emerson

Service suspension: 19:17 CT - February 10, 2022
Service resumption: 13:49 CT - February 16, 2022

Disruption activity:

• January 23; January 29 to January 31: Convoys of vehicles ("slow roll" events) assembled near the port. The convoy did not directly obstruct traffic save for a brief period of full road blockage on January 30
• February 9: Slow roll event near the Port; no operational impacts reported
• February 10: Assembled individuals formed a blockade 1.5km north of the port, blocking both north and southbound traffic. As a result, a Border Alert was issued at 19:17 CT
• During Emerson closure, traffic was redirected to alternate POEs Winkler, Gretna, and Tolstoi (Manitoba), with after hour service available at Sprague and Boissevain (24/7 operation)
• February 16: Dispersal of blockade sees port services resume (message issued at 13:49 CT)

Pacific Highway

Service suspension: 18:15 PST - February 12, 2022
Service resumption: 05:44 PST - February 15, 2022

Disruption activity:

• February 7: Small groups begin assembling near Pacific Highway POE, holding signs but not impeding vehicle access. By February 11, the daily assembly size grew to 150 to 200 people in areas near to the POE. CBSA management met with RCMP to discuss the situation, and RCMP set up check-points and containment areas in key locations near the port
• February 12: Access to Pac Highway POE disrupted due to vehicles blocking north and southbound traffic. A Border Alert was issued at 18:15 PST
• February 15: RCMP cleared individuals and vehicles causing service disruption, and a service resumption message was issued at 05:44 PST
• February 28: Daily numbers of individuals assembling near the POE were decreased, and the RCMP removed cement barriers and checkpoints from the area. No further operational impacts

Service suspension: 13:01 PST - February 19, 2022
Service resumption: 20:39 PST - February 19, 2022

Disruption activity:

February 19: RCMP closed north and south highway access in response to assembly activity. A Border Alert was issued at 13:01 PST. At 20:39 PST a service resumption message was issued when RCMP re-opened highway access following decreased assembly activity.

Figure 1 - Text version

Timeline of protest activity/Blockades from February 7 to 19, 2022 at POEs

• Ambassador: Service Suspension - Feb 7 @ 20:59 ET
• Emerson: Service Suspension - Feb 10 @ 19:17 CT
• Coutts: RCMP request to suspend services - Feb 11
• Coutts: Service Suspension - Feb 12 @ 12:18 MT
• Pacific Highway: Service Suspension - Feb 12 @ 18:15 PST
• Ambassador: Resumption - Feb 14 @ 00:11 ET
• Government of Canada Announces public emergency - Feb 14 @ aft
• Pacific Highway: Resumption - Feb 15 @ 05:44 PST
• Coutts: Resumption - Feb 15 @ 10:46 MT
• Invocation of Emergency Act - Feb 15 @ ~18:00
• Emerson: Resumption - Feb 16 @ 13:49 CT
• Pacific Highway: Service Suspension - Feb 19 @ 13:01 PST
• Pacific Highway: Resumption - Feb 19 @ 20:39 PST

Impact of protest activity/Blockades from February 7 to 19, 2022 at POEs

The blockades resulted in sustained disruptions to industry and threats to commercial trade. In addition to many disruptions of shorter duration, four key border crossings experienced multi-day closures: Ambassador Bridge, Coutts, Emerson and Pacific Highway. These four crossings together represent approximately 44% of the volume of Canada's commercial imports by land ports of entry and half of the total value for duty nationally.^{Footnote 1} [Note: The blockades also interrupted exports from Canada to the US. CBSA does not have the export data for land POEs entering into the USA. StatsCan receives data directly from U.S. Census Bureau for imports from Canada].

The table below shows the effect of the blockades on commercial conveyance passages compared to the equivalent week in 2021:

Commercial conveyances from February 7 to 19 ^{Footnote 2}, ^{Footnote 3}

One month after the blockades, the four crossings that experienced closures seem to be mostly back to normal. The volumes at Ambassador Bridge, Emerson and Pacific Highway were only 4 to 5% below the equivalent week in 2021, while the volume at Coutts was essentially the same as the equivalent week in 2021.

Commercial conveyances from March 7 to 19

Southern Ontario Region (SOR)

Volumes: During the time the blockade of the Ambassador Bridge was in effect (evening of February 7 to February 13), 50,835 commercial conveyances were still able to enter Canada across SOR's ports of entries. By comparison to the same period in the previous calendar year, SOR processed approximately 60,307 commercial conveyances. As such, 9,472 fewer commercial conveyances were able to enter Canada; a reduction of ~16% overall for the week (see chart below).

One month after the start of the blockade (March 7 to 13), the volume at Ambassador Bridge was about 4% below the 2021 level. The total volume for SOR POEs was essentially back to normal – less than 1% below the 2021 level.

Border wait times^{Footnote 4}: During the week of February 7 to 13 2022, SOR Commercial Operations cumulatively experienced a total of 315 working hours where wait times were over service standards (45 minutes); 303 working hours were over 60 minutes. The most notable wait time occurring on February 8 at the Bluewater Bridge which experienced a 9 km US bound & 10.4 km Canada bound backup.

Industry: Toyota Motor Corp, Ford Motor Co and General Motors Co indicated the disruption forced production cuts at plants in Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Alabama and Ontario. Chrysler-parent Stellantis cut short multiple shifts due to parts shortages, and Honda said it was temporarily suspending manufacturing on one production line at its plant in Alliston, Ontario. Anderson Economic Group (AEG) estimates that the auto industry lost US$299.9 million between the dates of February 7 to February 15.

Prairie Region (PRA)

Volumes: During the time the blockades of the Coutts and Emerson POEs were in effect (February 9 to February 16), 10,100 commercial conveyances were still able to enter Canada across PRA's ports of entries. By comparison to the same period in the previous calendar year, PRA processed approximately 11,179 commercial conveyances. As such, 1,079 fewer commercial conveyances were able to enter Canada; a reduction of ~10% overall for the week (see chart below).

One month after the start of the blockades (March 9 to 16), the volume at Coutts was almost the same as that in 2021, while at Emerson, the volume was about 4% below. Overall, the volume in PRA was also essentially back to normal – less than 1% below the 2021 level.

Border wait times: During the week of February 9 to 16 2022, PRA Commercial Operations experienced a total of 491 hours of wait times over service standards (45 minutes), all of which were over 60 minutes and occurred at Coutts.

Pacific Region (PAC)

PAC Region also experienced disruptions to commercial traffic from February 12 to 19, with traffic at the Pacific Highway POE forced to reroute to neighbouring POEs.

Volumes: During the time the blockade of the Pacific Highway POE was in effect (February 12 to February 19), 13,697 commercial conveyances were still able to enter Canada across PAC's ports of entries. By comparison to the same period in the previous calendar year, PAC processed approximately 13,904 commercial conveyances. As such, 207 fewer commercial conveyances were able to enter Canada; a reduction of ~1.5% overall for the week (see chart below).

One month after the start of the blockade (March 12 to 19), the volume at Pacific Highway was close to the 2021 level – less than 5% below. However, the volumes at both Aldergrove and Huntingdon were much lower than last year – 15% below for the former and almost 19% for the latter. As a result, the total volume at the Pacific region POEs saw a decline of more than 9% when compared to the same period last year.

Border wait times: During the week of February 12 to 19 2022, PAC Commercial Operations experienced a total of 7 hours of wait times over service standards (45 minutes); 3.6 hours were over 60 minutes. The most notable wait time occurring on February 19 at the Aldergrove, which experienced a wait time of 82 minutes at 2 pm.

Timeline at Coutts, Alberta

Timeline:

Figure 2 - Text version

Timeline of protest activity/Blockades at Coutts from February 11 to 15

• RCMP request to suspend services: Feb 11
• Service suspension: Feb 12 @ 12:18 MT
• Resumption: Feb 15 @ 10:46 MT
• Invocation of Emergencies Act: Feb 15 @ ~18:00 EST

Impact of the Emergencies Act on Coutts

Though protest activities impacting the Coutts POE were cleared prior to the proclamation of a public order emergency, the invocation of the EA likely impacted participants' willingness to continue taking part in such activities.

The Emergency Measures Regulations (EMR) did not provide CBSA officers with additional authorities to protect or maintain the peace, or enforce other Criminal Code provisions at the border. However, authorities added to CBSA officers related to the prohibition of certain foreign nationals who entered Canada in contravention of the Regulations.

Dealing with and clearing protest activities in the vicinity of Coutts (including near Milk River, Alberta), which impacted the CBSA's service delivery, fell under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement authorities.

The EMR provided law enforcement officers with additional authorities to protect critical infrastructure, such as POEs. In that respect, the Regulations were needed for law enforcement to be able to re-establish and maintain business continuity at Coutts and secure trade corridors.

Impact of protest activity/Blockades February 9 to 16, 2022 at Coutts

The blockades resulted in sustained disruptions to industry and threats to commercial trade. In addition to many disruptions of shorter duration, the Coutts POE experienced multi-day closures (February 12 to February 15).

One month after the blockades, border crossings that experienced closures seemed to be mostly back to normal. Between March 9 to 16, 2022, the volume at Coutts was essentially the same as the equivalent week in 2021.

The table below shows the effect of the blockades on commercial conveyance passages compared to the equivalent weeks in 2021:

Questions and answers

1. What new authorities did the CBSA have under the Emergencies Act and Emergency Measures Regulations?

The CBSA was given the new authority to prohibit non-exempted foreign nationals from entering Canada if they were seeking to participate in or facilitate a prohibited public assembly. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations require compliance with the Emergency Measures Regulations on all temporary residents, giving the CBSA the authority prohibit entry.

Since the Emergency Measures Regulations were repealed, the CBSA can no longer deny entry to Canada foreign nationals seeking entry to participate in or facilitate public assemblies that were temporarily prohibited.

Though the Emergency Measures Regulations did not give the CBSA new authorities with respect to goods, CBSA officers could have relied on their authorities under the Customs Act to detain goods while confirming with police whether their importation was prohibited under the Criminal Code due to a contravention of the Emergency Measures Regulations.

2. Did the additional powers under the Emergency Measures Regulations help border services officers, or did that remain the authority of the police of jurisdiction?

The Agency has clear authorities which are exercised at POEs and other border locations (including warehouses and areas controlled by customs). The CBSA will continue to support its law enforcement partners.

The Emergency Measures Regulations engaged existing authorities under which CBSA officers could refuse entry to foreign nationals arriving in Canada with the intent to participate in or facilitate a prohibited assembly. There were limited exemptions to the prohibition on entry for specific classes of foreign nationals, including people registered under the Indian Act and people protected under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

Additionally, the enactment of the Emergencies Act provided authorities and powers to local law enforcement to clear the exit points of impacted ports of entry (POEs). The clearance of the exit points at POEs resulted in the ability for the CBSA to recommence the processing of commercial traffic which reduced delays and the need to re-route traffic at impacted POEs. Without the clearance of exit points, the delays, re-routing and backlogs would have continued.

Furthermore, the Criminal Code prohibits the importing of goods that were obtained or derived from the commission of an offence, and under the Emergency Measures Regulations, it was an offense to collect goods in support of unlawful demonstrations. CBSA officers were able detain such goods under existing authorities on a case-by-case basis.

3. Since the Emergency Measures Regulations were repealed, what powers did the CBSA have under its existing authorities?

Without the Emergency Measures Regulations, the CBSA can no longer prohibit the entry of foreign nationals solely because they wish to enter Canada to participate in or facilitate a public assembly prohibited by the Emergency Measures Regulations.

Imported goods collected to support assemblies that were prohibited under the regulations can no longer be detained at the border. (It is important to note that the CBSA did not require any new powers under the Emergencies Act to do this – border services officers (BSOs) were already able to temporarily detain goods under the Criminal Code if they felt the goods were prohibited by any Act of Parliament – including the Emergencies Act.)

The CBSA has authorities under the IRPA to refuse entry to foreign nationals who are inadmissible to Canada. Several factors are used in determining case-by-case admissibility, including involvement in criminal activity, in human rights violations, in organized crime, security, health or financial reasons.

In addition, CBSA officers have the authority to administer the Orders in Council (OICs) made pursuant to the Quarantine Act, which prohibit entry to foreign nationals who are not fully vaccinated, do not have a suitable pre-arrival COVID-19 molecular test, or have signs or symptoms of COVID-19, suspect they have COVID-19, or know they have COVID-19.

4. Did the CBSA exercise these new authorities to turn people away?

Yes, we used the new authorities to turn people away from the border when they were still in effect.

The enactment of the Emergency Measures Regulations meant that CBSA officers were able to refuse entry to foreign nationals arriving in Canada who intended to participate in or facilitate a prohibited public assembly.

There were some exemptions to prohibiting entry. These were for specific classes of foreign nationals, including people registered under the Indian Act, and protected persons as defined under the IRPA.

We should note that BSOs already had the authority to deny entry to anyone who did not meet the requirements to enter and/or stay in Canada under the IRPA and the Quarantine Act, as well as any person in a class of people whose presence in Canada, as determined by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, is in the national interest.

5. New   The CBSA was able to clear protest activity at a few POEs before the EA was invoked. Did the CBSA really need the authorities under the Emergency Measures Regulations to clear protests at the border?

The Emergency Measures Regulations did not provide CBSA officers with any new or additional authorities to protect or maintain the peace, or enforce other Criminal Code provisions, at the border. The only authorities that were added to CBSA officers were those related to the prohibition of certain foreign nationals who entered Canada in contravention of the Regulations.

Dealing with and clearing protest activities in the vicinity of POEs, which impacted the CBSA's service delivery, fell under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement authorities.

The Emergency Measures Regulations provided law enforcement officers with additional authorities to protect critical infrastructure, such as POEs. So, in that respect, yes, the Regulations were needed for law enforcement to be able to re-establish and maintain business continuity at POEs.

6. The Prime Minister has said the CBSA has refused entry to individuals trying to enter Canada to participate in the protests. Where and how many?

That is correct – when the Emergency Measures Regulations were still in effect, the CBSA denied entry to foreign nationals who were seeking to enter Canada to participate in the demonstrations.

Using existing enforcement authorities, as well as those provided under the Emergency Measures Regulations, the CBSA directed some foreign nationals back to the United States. In other cases, travellers chose to leave Canada voluntarily.

While we can't speak to specific cases, we can tell you foreign nationals' admissibility was decided case-by-case at the time of entry.

7. What is the CBSA doing to protect its assets (such as its offices and buildings)? What new steps is the CBSA taking to protect its POEs, as critical infrastructure, in the wake of this enactment?

We continually evaluated the evolving situations at our POEs and ensured protective measures were in place. These measures provided for the safety and security of the public and our employees while supporting the continuous flow of legitimate travel and trade.

The Agency monitored changes in demand for border services at alternate POEs and adjusted staffing levels and hours of service when needed to minimize processing times and potential delays.

We worked with our law enforcement partners to restore normal border operations at affected POEs as quickly as possible and deal with potential blockades.

The CBSA is legally obliged to ensure the health and safety of its employees and anyone under its care and control. The Agency also has an interest in protecting its facilities so it can continue to serve the public.

If there's a reason to believe buildings or offices and travellers or employees are at risk of physical damage or harm, the Agency will work closely with law enforcement partners to protect the integrity of its facilities and the safety of all.

While POEs are secure areas, the importance of securing access routes cannot be overstated as this was at the core of the inability to move travellers and cargo across the border. As this is out of CBSA's authority, we worked with our local police of jurisdiction to ensure the safety and security of CBSA employees to access and leave their workplace safely. This remains an area for the CBSA which we continue to mitigate.

Assessments were completed at 22 commercial crossings identified as high-risk POEs. Where required, temporary jersey barriers, fencing and CCTV connectivity to the Border Operations Centre was connected to maintain 24 hours monitoring.

8. New   Was there any damage done to CBSA property during the blockades? If so, what is the amount of damage?

No, the CBSA was not informed of any damages to its facilities as a result of the protests at POEs.

9. What is the CBSA doing at POEs that will ensure the integrity of our borders going forward?

Although all of the CBSA's impacted POEs have now reopened, the CBSA continues to adjust operations as the threat environment changes in collaboration with law enforcement partners and in close consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the local and regional levels.

The CBSA embedded management representatives within the law enforcement incident command structure where unlawful protests were underway or were planned. The CBSA shared all available intelligence with our partners and took the appropriate steps to enhance vigilance at POEs with more traveller examinations and more building and infrastructure security measures.

The CBSA strengthened its collaboration with public safety partners and continued working with its law enforcement partners to manage the impacts of the prohibited assemblies on travel and trade. Mitigation measures continue to be put in place to lower the vulnerability of our highest-risk POEs.

In order to prevent those engaging in unlawful assemblies from hindering international trade, the CBSA and local officials took concrete steps to harden POE operations and the associated trade corridors leading to and from them. This included deployment of temporary building and infrastructure security measures based on the threat risk.

Classifying trade corridors as protected areas under the Emergency Measures Regulations permitted police forces of jurisdiction to take steps to clear activities near Canada's ports of entry, thereby re-establishing and maintaining critical supply chains.

10. What did BSOs do if they believed foreign nationals were making false statements and were in fact entering Canada to participate in the protests?

BSOs are highly trained to interview travellers. When examining travellers at the POE, BSOs use a number of databases, as well as their skills in interview techniques, document verification and observation to confirm whether a foreign national meets the requirements to enter Canada.

If CBSA officers had sufficient evidence to determine that a foreign national was inadmissible, they relied on the existing IRPA authorities and used appropriate options. Similarly, foreign nationals who BSOs believed were entering Canada to participate in prohibited public assemblies were prohibited from entry.

11. What are the repercussions for hindering the work of a BSO?

Anyone who hinders or obstructs an officer in the performance or course of their duties may be arrested by the CBSA and could face criminal charges.

12. Is the CBSA aware of foreign nationals who may have been participating in the unlawful protests?

Our law enforcement partners have not made any referrals to the CBSA regarding foreign nationals partaking in illegal activity associated with the prohibited public assemblies.

13. As armed peace officers, were CBSA officers asked to support other law enforcement agencies in enforcing municipal bylaws or provincial regulations, or in helping break up protests, etc… either at POEs or in nearby communities?

CBSA officers were not engaged in law enforcement activities that extended beyond their already-existing authorities related to their mandate at the POE.

14. Were any CBSA officers identified as Freedom Convoy participants? What is the Agency's position in this case?

All allegations of improper or illegal behaviour by CBSA employees are thoroughly investigated and acted upon accordingly. Each case is assessed to determine the appropriate disciplinary measure, up to and including termination.

CBSA employees are expected to ensure their comments and behaviour – in both their personal and public lives – do not impair, or are not perceived as impairing, their ability to perform their duties impartially as public servants.

This ensures they do not:

• undermine or compromise the integrity or security of CBSA operations, its employees, or national security
• conflict with their ability to carry out their duties
• impair the CBSA's ability to carry out its mandate

If a CBSA employee is found to be involved in criminal activity, they may be subject to prosecution, as would any individual.

15. Does the CBSA have any contracts with organizations that supported the Freedom Convoy?

The CBSA has a rigorous contracting process and follows all government of Canada contracting policies and procedures when awarding contracts.

Before any contract is awarded, the Agency evaluates the company's ability to provide the goods or services required using pre-determined criteria. A security evaluation is also part of the process and companies are excluded if they have been convicted of illegal activity, in alignment with Government of Canada contracting policies.

The contracts outline detailed terms and conditions that companies must follow in order not to default. The companies are expected to abide by these contracts.

The CBSA can terminate contacts if it is discovered that a company has engaged in illegal activities.

16. Were BSOs fully briefed on their new powers under the Emergencies Act?

Directions on how to exercise new authorities under the Emergency Measures Regulations when they were still in effect were provided to officers across the country through daily shift briefings, updated guidance documents, and other opportunities.

17. Could BSOs have refused entry or arrested Canadian citizens who are coming back into Canada to participate in the protests?

The CBSA cannot refuse entry to anyone with a right of entry, such as Canadian citizens, permanent residents or those registered under the Indian Act.

18. The CBSA stated on January 13 that truckers were still going to be exempt from the requirement to be vaccinated. It was corrected by Ministers who stated that the exemption would end on January 15 as previously announced. Can you give us more information about what happened and the impact?

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is responsible for the Quarantine Act and Orders that outline traveller's obligations. We work in close cooperation to implement the measures put in place by PHAC.

The communication you are referring to was corrected within a few hours and teams were in touch with industry representatives quickly to ensure they had the correct information.

To be clear, since January 15, all truck drivers with a right of entry who are not fully vaccinated are required to quarantine upon their return and undergo COVID-19 tests (and as of January 22, they are not eligible to enter the U.S.).

Furthermore, as of January 15, foreign national truck drivers who are not fully vaccinated are not eligible to be admitted into Canada.

Our experience to date with changes at the border is that there is a transition over the initial days where travellers and commercial traffic adapt to the new measures. It is fair to say that after the transition phase passed, the volume returned to what we have seen for the same period over the few last years (approximately 100,000 truck drivers in a week).

Latest stats:

19. Did the CBSA have a role in flagging financial accounts of "designated persons" under the Emergency Economic Measures Order (EEMO)?

As per the EEMO, it would have been up to the financial institution, which might have become aware of a "designated person" under the EEMO from the RCMP, to flag accounts.

The CBSA did not make a determination as to whether someone was a designated person for the purposes of the EEMO as that would have been done by the police of jurisdiction.