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Overview: Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security: Canada’s Security Posture in Relation to Russia (June 9, 2022)

Scenario note

Background

Following Ukraine’s invasion by Russian forces in , parliamentarians have raised concerns about Canada’s preparedness to foreign threats. Several committees have undertaken studies on the various facets of the issue, including Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (TRAN) and the CBSA’S home committee, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

The TRAN adopted a motion to study Canada’s preparedness to respond to Russian threats to Canadian waters, ports and airspace. On , the Vice President of the Travellers Branch appeared before TRAN, alongside officials from Public Safety (PS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). For the most part, questions were directed at PS and CSE and focused on cyber security. Questions answered by the CBSA were related to foreign vessels in Canadian airspace and waterways, the impact of sanctions on the Agency, and processing refugees.

Similarly, on , the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) adopted a motion study on Canada’s emergency preparedness for the range of threats posed by Russia:

That pursuant to Standing Order 108 (2), the committee immediately begin a study on Canada’s emergency preparedness for the range of threats posed by Russia, including threats to Canada’s public safety and national security, the prevalence and impact of Russian misinformation, as well as the threat that Russia could resort to the use of espionage, sabotage, and weapons of mass destruction; that this study includes at least eight meetings; that the committee invite the Ministers of Public Safety, Emergency Preparedness and National Defence to appear; and other witnesses as requested by the committee; that the committee report its findings to the House; and that, pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Government table a comprehensive response to the report.

In late March and early April, SECU held two meetings on Canada’s security posture in relation to Russia, and heard testimony from academics and stakeholders. Questions were heavily focused on cyber security and Canada’s national defence. Stakeholders have also questioned Canada’s readiness and proactivity regarding the protection of critical infrastructure. Discussions related to borders were broad, given that, as witnesses noted, “in the internet cyber world, that world knows no borders.” It was mentioned in passing that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has generated massive flows of refugees. Given the CBSA’s role in the resettlement of Ukrainians, SECU members may be interested its progress.

The Minister of Emergency Preparedness and the Public Safety Deputy Minister appeared before the committee on June 2. The Minister of Public Safety, alongside his portfolio officials, has been invited to appear on June 9 for the first hour of the meeting. It is expected that National Defence officials will appear on June 16.

Parliamentary context

Since 2014, the Government of Canada has imposed sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) in order to respond to the gravity of Russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Opposition parties have repeatedly called on the Government to take further and drastic action against the Russian Federation, though not necessarily through sanctions. SECU members have raised concerns about NATO spending, defence of the Arctic, the threat of cyber-attacks, and widespread misinformation and interference.

On , the Honourable Marc Gold, the Government Representative in the Senate, introduced S-8, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. If passed, the legislation would strengthen the Government’s response to Russian aggression, by aligning Canada’s inadmissibility framework with Canada’s sanctions framework. On May 19, S-8 was quickly debated at Second Reading, with only Senator Harder (Progressive Senate Group) and Senator MacDonald (Conservative) delivering remarks. While Senator MacDonald was very supportive of S-8, he raised concerns regarding those who may abuse their right to making a refugee claim at a port of entry as well as Canada’s response to Russian aggression being reactive (citing that Russian aggression began with the invasion of Ukraine in 2014).

General information

Date:
Time: 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
Location: Wellington Building, Room 425 (TBC)
Mode: The meeting will be in a hybrid setting. The Minister is likely to appear in person while witnesses may appear in the mode of their choosing.

Appearing:

11:00 am to 12:00 pm

The Honourable Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety

Witnesses (TBC):

11:00 am to 12:00 pm

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Brenda Lucki, Commissioner of the RCMP

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

David Vigneault, Director of the CSIS

Canada Border Services Agency

John Ossowski, President of the CBSA

SECU Members:

  • Liberal Party of Canada
    • The Honourable Jim Carr, Chair
    • Paul Chiang
    • Pam Damoff, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety
    • Ron McKinnon
    • Taleeb Noormohamed
    • Sameer Zuberi
  • Conservative Party of Canada
    • Raquel Dancho, Shadow Minister for Public Safety
    • Dane Lloyd, Shadow Minister for Emergency Preparedness
    • Doug Shipley
    • Tako Van Popta
  • Bloc Québecois

    Kristina Michaud, Critic for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Climate Change, Youth

  • New Democratic Party of Canada

    Alistair MacGregor, Critic for Public Safety, Agriculture and Food; Deputy Critic for Justice)

Opening remarks

At the beginning of the meeting, the Chair will invite the Minister to deliver his opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from Committee members to all officials. At this time, it is expected that only the Minister will be providing opening remarks.

Rounds of questioning

At the Chair's discretion, questions from committee members will proceed as follows:

  • First round: 6 minutes for each party in the following order: CPC, LPC, BQ, NDP
  • For the second and subsequent rounds: CPC, 5 minutes; LPC, 5 minutes; BQ 2.5 minutes and NDP 2.5 minutes; CPC, 5 minutes ; LPC, 5 minutes

The Minister and supporting officials will only attend the first hour of the meeting. The committee will move in camera from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm to discuss committee business.

Placemat: Key messages

How does CBSA determine threats coming from Russia?

CBSA uses intelligence and data to determine risk and inform admissibility decisions for people and goods. CBSA works closely with domestic partners such as the RCMP, CSIS, FINTRAC and GAC to maintain the integrity of Canada’s immigration system and supply chain.

CBSA collaborates with international partners (U.S., UK, Australia, and New Zealand) to identify and act on border-related threats.

Cyber threats: CBSA primarily collaborates with the Communications Security Establishment, Shared Services Canada and B5 partners to defend its IT operations.

How does the CBSA prevent the entry of potentially hazardous materials?

As a requirement under the Container Security Initiative Partnership Agreement between CBSA and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, all containers entering Canada by marine must be screened for radiation.

The five major commercial vessel ports that receive the majority of Canada’s containerized cargo – Montreal (QC), Halifax (NS), Saint John (NB), Vancouver (BC), and Prince Rupert (BC) – have permanent radiation screening portals, designed for scanning large quantities of containers and for continuously monitoring for radiation.

All vessels carrying containerized cargo from overseas must report to one of these five ports as their first point of arrival into Canada.

Is CBSA supporting humanitarian efforts in Ukraine?

CBSA supports the “Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET)” as a temporary accelerated residence pathway for Ukrainians seeking a haven in Canada during the war.

As of , the total number of arrivals of Ukrainian nationals is over 23,000 (land and air):

  • CUAET: 18.2K arrivals
  • Non-CUAET: 5.6K arrivals

Charter flights for CUAET visa holders from Warsaw arrived on May 23 (Winnipeg), May 29 (Montreal) and June 2 (Halifax).

With so many arrivals, how does the CBSA ensure that the person arriving is, indeed, that person?

Ukrainians are admitted to Canada as temporary residents and must first apply and obtain a temporary resident visa prior to seeking entry.

The application process is completed overseas by IRCC, who certifies valid travel documents, confirms identities, and collects biometrics.

CBSA has not aware of any improperly documented Ukrainian national related to the CUAET initiative.

What’s the role of the CBSA in administering the Special Economic Measures Act?

CBSA helps GAC administer the Special Economic Measures Act, the United Nations Act, and the Export and Import Permits Act and associated regulations.

The Intelligence and Targeting programs work with domestic and international partners to collect information and intelligence to help frontline officers interdict inadmissible individuals and goods.

GAC updates CBSA on new individuals, entities or goods that are subject to sanctions and provides the CBSA with recommendations related to detained shipments.

BSOs apply the recommendations at ports of entry, including potential further enforcement actions, such as Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs), seizures or charges by CBSA or the RCMP.

CBSA continues its engagement with GAC to ensure we are able to support and respond to the new sanctions being levied by the Government of Canada. We are also working at a national and regional level to share guidance and intelligence consistently and ensure that sanctions are being appropriately enforced.

CBSA has updated its Counter Proliferation Management System (CPMS) with the new sanctions to assist with risk assessment of exported goods, including raising the risk assessment priority level of goods destined to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in response to the new sanctions.

CBSA has issued over 900 lookouts for individuals sanctioned under SEMA. As of , there were no interceptions of Russian nationals who are the target of lookouts.

There have been no seizure of commercial goods as goods are intercepted before they enter the country and are denied entry.

What is CBSA’s role when it comes to investigating potential war crimes?

CBSA is supporting the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program efforts by providing information pamphlets to travellers arriving from the Ukraine encouraging them to contact the RCMP with any relevant evidence.

If pressed: CBSA has also provided guidance to BSOs as many travellers from Ukraine have arrived after a very traumatic experience, and operational instructions also included monitoring for victims and witnesses of potential war crimes and human trafficking indicators.

CBSA is working with partners to monitor and identify high risk travellers who departed Canada on a one-way ticket and returning from Ukraine/Poland over the next several months.

Are there additional tools that the Agency uses to support the Government's efforts?

In addition to applying SEMA, CBSA applies the Customs Act and the IRPA to verify the admissibility of the crew, non-sanctioned cargo, and the conveyance itself for all marine vessels.

As part of implementing trade and economic sanctions, CBSA works closely with Finance Canada and GAC to operationalize changes to the Customs Tariff, through the use of trade tools like the Most-Favoured-Nation status, import bans, and export restrictions to disadvantage and disrupt trade to/from sanctioned states and non-foreign state actors.

The CBSA has been working with partners to support the Budget Implementation Act amendments that would allow for the seizure and disposition of assets of individuals sanctioned under SEMA.

Although there are minimal implications to forfeiture orders for property that is already located in Canada, we anticipate that if assets start to be seized, there may be attempts to divert or move other assets through the border.

What does S-8, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) aim to do?

Foreign nationals subject to sanctions imposed unilaterally by Canada under SEMA result in inadmissibility in some instances, but not others.

Sanctioned individuals may still travel to, enter, or remain in Canada, unless they are inadmissible for another reason.

The new IRPA inadmissibility provisions would align with sanction provisions so that any foreign national who is subject to either unilateral (such as SEMA) or multilateral (such as the United Nations Act) sanctions would be inadmissible for the duration of the sanction.

These changes would allow CBSA to deny entry to, and remove, individuals subjected to sanctions. They would also allow IRCC officials to deny temporary visas overseas.

These changes would ensure that the sanctions have further consequences in terms of immigration and access to Canada.

GAC has imposed sanctions against individuals who are part of, or are key supports of, the Russian regime. The sanctions were issued based on the grounds of “grave breach of international peace and security” set out within SEMA. The IRPA will be expanded to include all grounds listed under SEMA, including this ground.

Foreign nationals who are inadmissible to Canada may have their applications for temporary resident visas refused by IRCC officials, or may have their applications to enter Canada at ports of entry refused and removed from Canada by CBSA officials.

Key messages

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) keeps keeping the border and Canadians safe by administering key legislation to help Canada respond to threats to international peace and security

1. Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA)

Imposing trade and economic sanctions against foreign statesFootnote 1 and non-state actors that have significant political influence is an important instrument for the international community in enforcing international norms and laws.

The CBSA helps Global Affairs Canada (GAC) administer the Special Economic Measures Act, the United Nations Act, and the Export and Import Permits Act and associated regulations.

The CBSA’s Intelligence and Targeting programs work with domestic and international partners to collect information and intelligence to help frontline officers interdict inadmissible individuals and goods listed under SEMA.

When goods arrive at the border, the CBSA reviews import/export documents (bills of lading, invoices and certificates of origin issued by the relevant government authority) to determine if the goods or shipment/transactions are subject to prohibition or control measures. Shipments that appear to contravene trade and economic sanctions legislation will be detained based on the authority provided by the Customs Act. GAC is then notified of possible infractions of the legislation under SEMA for further assessment.

The CBSA also regularly receives updates from GAC regarding new individuals, entities or goods that are subject to sanctions (such as technology) and ensures frontline border services officers are well supported to prevent the entry or export of goods in all streams, including marine, air, land, rail and the courier/postal stream.

Additionally, GAC provides the CBSA with recommendations related to detained shipments. The border services officers apply the recommendations at the border points of entry, including potential further enforcement actions, such as seizures or charges by the CBSA or the RCMP.

Timely CBSA recommendations ensure the appropriate action can be taken at the time of entry. Should a vessel that is subject to sanctions be brought into port by the RCMP and/or the coast guard, crew and cargo will be processed as usual by the CBSA, including screening for inadmissible goods.

Further, the CBSA supports GAC and Transport Canada (TC) to ensure that American and Canadian sanctions are appropriately implemented in shared waterways, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway.

In addition to applying SEMA, the CBSA applies the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to verify the admissibility of the crew, non-sanctioned cargo, and the conveyance itself for all marine vessels. The CBSA supports the administration of SEMA measures developed by GAC and the RCMP in other modes besides marine, such as rail and land cargo coming from Mexico, and goods arriving by post.

As part of implementing trade and economic sanctions, the CBSA also works closely with Finance Canada, and GAC to operationalize changes to the Customs Tariff, through the use of trade tools like the Most-Favoured-Nation status, import bans, and export restrictions to disadvantage and disrupt trade to/from sanctioned states and non-foreign state actors.

Import/export commercial sanctions

Recent amendments to the Special Economic Measures Regulations bans Russian-registered, owned, or controlled ships and fishing vessels in Canadian ports and internal waters. This is primarily a TC and an RCMP responsibility.

The Customs Act does not allow the CBSA to detain vessels subject to territorial sanctions (specifically the ban on Russian vessels from entering Canadian waters) or shipments related to sanctions on specific individuals or entities that are listed in the regulations. The CBSA may share information and notify the RCMP and GAC should the CBSA notice this type of non-compliance.

2. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)

For Travellers: The admissibility of all travellers is determined on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available to the border service officer at the time of entry. All travellers are processed in accordance with the IRPA and several factors are used in which provides for various inadmissibility grounds determining admissibility into Canada: involvement in criminal activity, human rights violations, and organized crime, as well as security, misrepresentation, failure to comply with IRPA, inadmissible family members, health and financial reasons can impact a person’s admissibility to Canada.

Temporary and permanent resident applicants: The Centre for Immigration National Security Screening contributes to Canada’s safety and security by screening foreign nationals seeking to enter Canada who may be inadmissible on security, human and international rights violations or organized crime grounds. In working with domestic and international partners at home and through Canadian missions abroad, the CBSA helps to identify people who may be inadmissible to Canada on those grounds.

3. S-8, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

As a result of the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the Government of Canada announced sanctions against Russia and more than 900 individuals. The basis for issuing these sanctions pursuant to SEMA is that a grave breach of international peace and security has occurred, which is likely to result in a serious international crisis.

However these sanctions don’t mean that sanctioned individuals will be denied entry to Canada under the IRPA. Sanctioned individuals may travel to, enter, or remain in Canada, unless they are inadmissible for another reason.

While other SEMA triggers, such as those related to international/human rights violations, can lead to inadmissibility under the IRPA, not all of the sanctioned individuals may be linked to these types of violations.

The new IRPA inadmissibility provisions would align with sanction provisions so that any foreign national who is subject to either unilateral (such as SEMA) or multilateral (such as the United Nations Act) sanctions would be inadmissible for the duration of the sanction.

These changes ensure that unilaterally sanctioned Russian officials and their supporters would be inadmissible to Canada.

The CBSA works with domestic and international partners to safeguard ports of entry and the border

The CBSA uses intelligence and other data to determine risk and inform admissibility decisions for both people and goods. The CBSA is one of eight core members of Canada’s security and intelligence community. It collaborates closely with domestic partner agencies such as Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, the RCMP, CSIS, FINTRAC, and GAC to maintain the integrity of Canada’s borders and supply chains.

The CBSA also closely collaborates with international partners, particularly agencies in the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand, to ensure that threats to Canada with a border nexus are identified and acted upon. This allows the CBSA to develop and implement timely responses to threats in all travel modes.

The CBSA also works with its public safety partners and other law enforcement agencies, regularly adjusting its frontline posture to respond to threats presented by arriving goods across different modes. For example, all containers entering Canada by marine must be screened for radiation with the radiation detection equipment at Canada’s major marine ports as a requirement under the Container Security Initiative Partnership Agreement between the CBSA and the United States Customs and Border Protection.

The five major commercial vessel ports that receive the majority of Canada’s containerized cargo – Montreal (QC), Halifax (NS), Saint John (NB), Vancouver (BC), and Prince Rupert (BC) – have permanent radiation screening portals, designed for scanning large quantities of containers and for continuously monitoring for radiation. All vessels carrying containerized cargo from overseas must report to one of these five ports as their first point of arrival into Canada.

Internally, the CBSA’s intelligence program is focused on collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence to assist frontline CBSA officers, including border services officers, in identifying and interdicting high-risk goods and individuals.

Information technology

In order to maintain the best cyber defence against online threats, the CBSA primarily collaborates with the Communications Security Establishment and Shared Services Canada, in addition to its B5 partners, which allows the CBSA to quickly react to hostile cyber activities.

Questions and answers

A) Questions raised in a parliamentary context

1) On March 21, the Minister of Transport alluded to a grounded cargo plane at the Pearson Airport. Can you tell us what was the role of the CBSA in this instance?

A Russian-owned Antonov cargo plane with COVID vaccines was recently grounded at the Pearson Airport by Transport Canada.

The Pearson Airport indicated that there are currently no operational impacts as a result and ultimately, the issue appears to be a Transport Canada matter, with little CBSA involvement.

B) Questions raised in the media context

1) What happens to the Russian nationals and passengers on the plane recently grounded in Yellowknife? Transport Canada confirmed the plane can leave, but only if it's without passengers. What happens to the people who were on that plane? Are they allowed to return home?

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) takes its border and national security responsibilities very seriously. The safety and protection of Canadians are the Agency’s top priorities.

The CBSA is bound by the Privacy Act in regards to personal information about a specific person or file and will not comment on specific cases.

What I can tell you is that on March 1, CBSA border services officers attended the arrival of a private aircraft landing in Yellowknife and processed all travellers in accordance with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

All persons seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and they must demonstrate they meet the requirements to enter and stay in Canada. Admissibility of all travellers is decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available at the time of entry. Several factors are used in determining admissibility into Canada, including involvement in criminal activity, in human rights violations, in organized crime, security, health or financial reasons.

C) Topic-specific questions

1. How are is the CBSA processing Russian Nationals at the ports of entry?

The CBSA’s role is to assess the security risk and admissibility of persons coming to Canada. All persons, including Canadian citizens, seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and may be subject to a more in-depth exam. Admissibility of all travelers is decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available at the time of entry. Russian Nationals (useless exempt: airlines, crew members etc.) are required to first obtain a Temporary Resident Visa from IRCC in order to enter Canada.

All persons seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and they must demonstrate they meet the requirements to enter and stay in Canada. Admissibility of all travellers is decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available at the time of entry. Several factors are used in determining admissibility into Canada, including involvement in criminal activity, in human rights violations, in organized crime, security, health or financial reasons.

2. What is the CBSA’s role in enforcing NOTAM’s?

Transport Canada is responsible for the issuance and enforcement of NOTAM’s. However, as CBSA is present at many ports of entry, should the CBSA become aware of a violation to the NOTAM, the CBSA would immediately notify Transport Canada.

A Russian-owned Antonov cargo plane has been grounded at Pearson by Transport Canada as of February 27. Pearson Airport has indicated that there are currently no operational impacts as a result. Ultimately, it appears to be entirely a Transport Canada issue with little CBSA involvement.

3. What is the CBSA’s role in enforcing sanctions against Russia? What role does the CBSA play with respect to cargo that arrives in Canada subject to sanctions under SEMA?

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is responsible for the establishing and administering laws and regulations pertaining to the imposition of sanctions and other measures against foreign states and non-state actors.

The CBSA has a mandate to ensure that all goods entering Canada don’t pose a risk to the health, safety, and security of Canadians, while facilitating the free flow of legitimate goods.

The CBSA reviews import/export documents, such as bills of lading, invoices and certificates of origin issued by the relevant government authority, to determine if goods or shipment/transactions are subject to prohibition or control measures.

Shipments that appear to be in contravention of the legislation on trade and economic sanctions will be detained based on the authority contained in the Customs Act. GAC is then informed of a possible infraction of the legislation on trade and economic sanctions, and one of its regulations.

GAC will provide the CBSA with recommendations related to detained shipments which may result in further enforcement actions such as seizures or penalties.

4. How does the CBSA ensure that all cargo entering Canada is screened for radiation?

The CBSA has installed screening equipment at the five major commercial vessel ports that receive the majority of Canada’s containerized cargo: Montreal (QC), Halifax (NS), Saint John (NB), Vancouver (BC) and Prince Rupert (BC).

These permanently affixed radiation screening portals are designed for scanning large quantities of containers and are continuously monitored for the presence of radiation.

All vessels carrying containerized cargo from overseas must report at their first point of arrival into Canada at one of the five commercial vessel ports with radiation screening capability.

5. How has the CBSA dealt with similar crises in the past? What lessons were learned?

The CBSA works closely with its partners to respond to emerging situations and threats. This can include implementing new restrictions on importing or exporting goods at the border and screening travellers and cargo for prohibited or high-risk goods.

In terms of similar sanctions, most recently, the CBSA implemented import export sanctions on behalf of GAC related to the North Korea, Iran, and the Russian-controlled area of Crimea in 2014.

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