ARCHIVED - Statement of Reasons

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OTTAWA, September 10, 2004

RR-2004-001
4366-18

Concerning a determination under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the
Special Import Measures Act regarding

CERTAIN CONCRETE REINFORCING BAR ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

DECISION

On August 26, 2004, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the Special Import Measures Act, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency determined that the expiry of the finding made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal on January 12, 2000, in Inquiry No. NQ-99-002, concerning certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods into Canada.

This statement of reasons is also available in French. Cet énoncé des motifs est également disponible en français.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• SUMMARY
• BACKGROUND
• PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
• CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTS
• PERIOD OF REVIEW
• CANADIAN INDUSTRY
  • Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation
  • Stelco Inc.
  • Ispat Sidbec
• CANADIAN MARKET
  • Table 1: Apparent Canadian Market for Rebar (Tonnes)
• ENFORCEMENT
• PARTICIPANTS
• INFORMATION USED BY THE PRESIDENT
  • Administrative Record
• PROCEDURAL ISSUES TO NOTE
  • Information not Considered after Closing of the Record
• POSITION OF THE PARTIES
  • Positions of the Canadian Producers - General
  • Positions of the Canadian Producers - Country Specific
    • Cuba
    • Korea
    • Turkey
  • Positions of the Turkish Producers
• CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS
  • Ferrous Scrap Market
    • Table 2: Average Pricing of Ferrous Scrap during the POR
  • Market Conditions in China
  • Market Conditions in Canada
  • Rebar Pricing - Cost Effect or Demand Pull
  • Import Pricing from the Named Countries
• Analysis by Country
  • Cuba
  • Korea
  • Turkey
• CONCLUSION
• FUTURE ACTION
• INFORMATION
• Appendix A

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SUMMARY

[1] On April 28, 2004, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (Tribunal), pursuant to subsection 76.03(3) of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), initiated an expiry review of its finding made on January 12, 2000, in Inquiry No. NQ-99-002. That finding concerned certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba (Cuba), the Republic of Korea (Korea) and the Republic of Turkey (Turkey) (collectively known as "the Named Countries"). The purpose of the expiry review is to determine whether the finding should be continued or rescinded. The finding is scheduled to expire on January 11, 2005.

[2] The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) initiated an expiry review on April 29, 2004, to determine whether the expiry of the finding is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods from the Named Countries.

[3] On August 26, 2004, the President of the CBSA (President) determined, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the SIMA, that the expiry of the finding was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping from each of the Named Countries.

BACKGROUND

[4] An anti-dumping investigation of certain concrete reinforcing bar (rebar¹), originating in or exported from Cuba, Korea and Turkey, was initiated on June 16, 1999. A preliminary determination of dumping concerning the subject goods was made on September 14, 1999. A final determination of dumping was made on December 13, 1999.² On January 12, 2000, the Tribunal issued a finding (Rebar I finding) that the dumping of the subject goods from Cuba, Korea and Turkey had caused injury to the domestic industry. Imports of rebar from these countries have been subject to anti-dumping measures since the date of the Rebar I finding.

[5] Subsequently, a second anti-dumping investigation resulted in a Tribunal finding on rebar from seven other countries. The second anti-dumping investigation was initiated on November 3, 2000, on rebar originating in or exported from the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Chinese Taipei and Ukraine. A final determination of dumping was made on May 2, 2001.³ On June 1, 2001, the Tribunal issued an injury finding⁴ (Rebar II finding). Imports from these countries have been subject to anti-dumping measures since the date of this second finding.

[6] As part of its enforcement responsibilities, the CBSA completed its last

re-investigation of normal values and export prices of the subject goods, covering both findings, on January 29, 2004. The results of this re-investigation were made public in Customs Notice N-556 on February 25, 2004.⁵

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

[7] For purposes of this expiry review, certain concrete reinforcing bar is defined as:

Hot-rolled deformed carbon or low alloy steel concrete reinforcing bar in straight lengths or coils, originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Turkey.

[8] Certain concrete reinforcing bar excludes the following products: plain round bar, rebar that has been further worked or fabricated (other than cut), and coated rebar.

[9] The Canadian standards for rebar are set out in the National Standard of Canada CAN/CSA-G30.18-M92 for Billet-Steel Bars for Concrete Reinforcement (the National Standard).

[10] In Canada, the following are the most common rebar designation numbers and sizes (in brackets): 10 (11.3), 15 (16.0), 20 (19.5), 25 (25.2), 30 (29.9), 35 (35.7), 45 (43.7), 55 (56.4). Rebar sizes are commonly referred to as the bar designation number combined with the letter "M". Thus, 10 M rebar is rebar with a bar designation number of 10 and a diameter of 11.3 millimetres.

[11] The National Standard identifies two grades of rebar, namely regular or "R" and weldable or "W". R grades are intended for general applications while W grades are used where welding, bending or ductility are of special concern.

[12] The National Standard also identifies yield strengths of 300, 400 and 500. The grade and yield strength of rebar is identified by combining yield strength number with grade. Thus, "400R" is regular rebar with a yield strength of 400, and "500W" is weldable rebar with a yield strength of 500.

[13] The standard lengths for rebar are 6 meters (20 feet), 12 meters (40 feet) and 18 meters (60 feet), although it can be cut and sold in other lengths, as specified by customers.

CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTS

[14] Rebar is normally imported into Canada under the following Harmonized System (HS) classification numbers⁶:

• 7213.10.00.00
• 7214.20.00.00

PERIOD OF REVIEW

[15] The period of review (POR) for this expiry review is January 1, 2001 to March 31, 2004.

CANADIAN INDUSTRY

[16] The Canadian industry for rebar production is currently comprised of:

• Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation of Whitby, Ontario, with production facilities in Whitby, Ontario, and Cambridge, Ontario, and Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Special Sections Inc.⁷ of Selkirk, Manitoba,
• Stelco Inc. of Hamilton, Ontario, and its wholly owned subsidiaries, AltaSteel Ltd., of Edmonton, Alberta⁸, and Norambar Inc. of Contrecoeur, Quebec,
• Ispat Sidbec Inc. of Contrecoeur, Quebec.

Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation

[17] Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation (Gerdau) represents three rebar producing entities: the Gerdau Whitby, Ontario plant (formerly Co-Steel Inc.), which has been producing rebar since 1964; the Gerdau Cambridge, Ontario plant (formerly Gerdau Courtice Steel), which has been producing rebar since 1987; and Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Special Sections Inc. of Selkirk, Manitoba, which has been producing rebar for over 75 years.⁹ For purposes of this Statement of Reasons, references to "Gerdau" include all three manufacturing entities.

[18] In October 2002, Gerdau S.A. and Co-Steel Inc. of Whitby, Ontario, entered into a transaction in which Gerdau S.A. acquired the shares of Co-Steel, leading to the establishment of Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation. In July 2003, Gerdau Courtice Steel Inc. changed its name to Gerdau Ameristeel Cambridge Inc. On September 26, 2003, Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation amalgamated with a number of entities including Gerdau Ameristeel Cambridge Inc. forming the existing Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation.¹⁰

[19] Gerdau's three rebar producing operations are capable of producing the full range of sizes and grades of rebar as described in the National Standard of Canada CAN/CSA-G30.18-M92 for Billet - Steel Bars for Concrete Reinforcement.

Stelco Inc.

[20] Stelco is one of Canada's largest integrated steel producers. Its main rebar production activities have been carried out by its two wholly owned subsidiaries, AltaSteel in Edmonton, Alberta and Norambar in Contrecoeur, Quebec. It also produces rebar on a limited basis at its facilities in Hamilton, Ontario.¹¹ For purposes of this Statement of Reasons, references to "Stelco" includes all three manufacturing units.

[21] AltaSteel began operations in the early 1950s as Premier Steel Mill Ltd. In 1962, Stelco purchased 100% of Premier Steel. From 1962 to 1992, Stelco operated the facility as a division. In 1992, the facility was incorporated in Alberta as a wholly owned subsidiary known as AltaSteel.¹² Recently, AltaSteel has indicated that it has stopped producing rebar.¹³

[22] Norambar was incorporated in August 1991 and is also a wholly owned subsidiary of Stelco Inc. Formerly called Stelco-McMaster Ltée, it was renamed Norambar Inc., effective January 21, 2004.¹⁴ It has been in operation and producing rebar since 1963. It produces various rebar sizes in both regular and weldable grades.¹⁵

[23] On January 29, 2004, Stelco received a court order granting creditor protection under the Companies' Creditor Arrangement Act (CCAA). During the stay period, Stelco is authorized to continue operations. In its First Quarter 2004 Report to the Shareholders, the Corporation indicated its plan to apply to the Court to extend the stay period beyond May 28, 2004. Other subsidiaries, including AltaSteel Ltd. and Norambar Inc., are not participating in the CCAA process.¹⁶ On May 27, 2004, the stay period under its court-supervised CCAA restructuring process was extended until September 30, 2004.¹⁷

Ispat Sidbec

[24] Ispat Sidbec Inc. of Contrecoeur, Quebec, was incorporated in 1928 and was purchased by Ispat International N.V. in 1994 and is now a wholly owned subsidiary of that company. This company is split into five different strategic business units: primary operations, flat rolled products, wire rod, bars and shapes and pipe. Ispat Sidbec Inc. (Sidbec) also owns several subsidiaries. Sidbec has been producing rebar since 1962. The bars and shapes business unit produces straight bars in rounds and flats at its plant in Longueuil, Quebec. Rebar in coil is produced at the Wire Rod Business Unit in Contrecoeur, Quebec.¹⁸

CANADIAN MARKET

[25] In 2003, the Canadian manufacturers produced and sold approximately 450,000 tonnes¹⁹ of rebar into the Canadian market.²⁰ Collectively, Gerdau, Stelco, and Sidbec represented about 60% of the Canadian market in 2003.²¹

[26] The apparent Canadian market²² for rebar has increased since the beginning of the Period of Review (POR) as indicated below:

Table 1: Apparent Canadian Market for Rebar (Tonnes)

Source	2001	2002	2003	Jan-March 2004
Canadian Producers	353,917	340,212	446,683	113,016
Total Imports	242,790	348,620	299,237	63,456
Total Market *	596,707	688,832	745,920	176,472

*Note: Rounding of previous lines may skew totals

ENFORCEMENT

[27] During the POR, all three of the Named Countries have shipped the subject goods to Canada.

[28] In the enforcement of the Rebar I finding during the POR, no subject goods were found to have been dumped.²³

PARTICIPANTS

[29] At the start of this expiry review, the Tribunal distributed a notice of the initiation of the expiry review and an expiry review schedule to interested persons including the Canadian producers, importers and exporters. At the same time, any person or government having an interest in the CBSA's review was invited to provide a submission containing information that they deemed relevant.

[30] Expiry Review Questionnaires (ERQs) were sent to the Canadian producers of rebar, known exporters of the goods originating in or exported from the Named Countries, and known Canadian importers of the goods to request information necessary for the President to consider the factors listed in subsection 37.2(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR) to determine the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping. Interested persons were also invited to provide case arguments regarding the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of the goods if the Rebar I finding expired. In addition, persons were provided an opportunity to submit reply submissions providing their comments in respect of the case arguments submitted by other persons.

[31] All three Canadian producers participated in the expiry review and provided a response to the producer ERQ. The Canadian producers, through their respective counsel, also provided case arguments and reply submissions stating that the dumping of subject goods would continue or resume should the Rebar I finding expire.

[32] Five exporters from Turkey and one exporter from Cuba provided information in response to the exporter ERQ. This consisted of the Turkish exporters Colakoglu Metalurji A.S. (Colakoglu); Habas Sinai ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal Endustri A.S. (Habas); Icdas Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi A.S. (Icdas); Diler Foreign Trade Inc. (Diler); Ekinciler Demir Ve Celik San A.S.(Ekinciler); and the Cuban exporter, Acinox S.A. (Acinox). No submissions were provided by any party from Korea.

[33] With the exception of Ekinciler, the aforementioned Turkish exporters also jointly submitted both case arguments and reply submissions, arguing that the export of the subject goods from Turkey was not likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping if the Rebar I finding expired. Acinox did not submit a case argument or reply submission.

[34] With regard to importers of the subject goods, one response to the importer ERQ was received from a non-resident importer, CCC Steel GMBH & Co. of Germany. No subsequent case arguments or reply submissions were received from this importer.

[35] None of the remaining importers that were contacted at initiation provided information within the time frames of the expiry review proceedings.

INFORMATION USED BY THE PRESIDENT

Administrative Record

[36] The information to be used and considered by the President for purposes of this expiry review proceeding is contained on the administrative record. The administrative record includes the exhibits listed on the CBSA's Exhibit Listing, which is comprised of the Tribunal's administrative record at initiation of the expiry review, CBSA exhibits and information submitted by interested persons, including information which they believe is relevant to the decision as to whether dumping is likely to continue or resume, absent the Rebar I finding. This information may consist of expert analysts reports, excerpts from trade magazines²⁴ and newspapers, orders and findings issued by authorities of Canada or of a country other than Canada, documents from international trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization, responses to the ERQs submitted by Canadian producers, importers and exporters.

[37] For purposes of an expiry review, the CBSA sets a date after which no "new" information may be placed on the administrative record. This is referred to as the "closing of the record date". For this expiry review, the administrative record closed on June 17, 2004. This allowed participants time to prepare their case arguments and reply submissions based on the information that was on the administrative record as of the closing of the record date.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES TO NOTE

[38] Normally, the President will not consider any new information submitted by participants subsequent to the closing of the record date. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to permit new information to be submitted. The President will consider the following factors in deciding whether to accept new information submitted after the closing of the record date:

• the availability of the information prior to the closing of the record date;
• the emergence of new or unforeseen issues;
• the relevance and materiality of the information;
• the opportunity for other participants to respond to the new information; and
• whether the new information can reasonably be taken into consideration by the President in making the determination.

[39] Participants wishing to file new information after the closing of the record date, either separately or in case arguments or reply submissions, must identify this information so that the President can decide whether it will be included on the record for purposes of the determination.

Information not Considered after Closing of the Record

[40] On July 29, 2004, Counsel for a non-resident importer, provided a partial response to the Importer ERQ, including commercial details of one sale to Canada made during the POR.²⁵

[41] The importer has been advised that since the information was available prior to the closing of the record date of June 17, 2004 and the response was filed well after that date, this information will not be taken into consideration by the President in rendering his decision.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

Parties Contending that Continued or Resumed Dumping is Likely

[42] All three Canadian producers provided responses to the ERQs, and case arguments and reply submissions, stating that the dumping of subject goods would continue or resume should the Rebar I finding expire. The Canadian producers made several similar arguments that applied to all the Named Countries before addressing country specific issues.

Positions of the Canadian Producers - General

[43] Regarding global developments, Stelco and Gerdau submitted that demand growth in China has been a major factor in the global steel industry in 2003 and 2004. Regarding rebar, in addition to increased exports to meet increased demand from China, Stelco and Gerdau state that there has been a related global strain on scrap supplies causing prices to escalate.²⁶

[44] Stelco added that even as prices climbed, rebar in China remained in over-supply, with long product²⁷ output in 2003 exceeding apparent domestic consumption by about 1 million tonnes. Stelco indicated that China is now a net exporter of bars and rod and the trend is expected to increase.²⁸

[45] Stelco submitted that over-supply in China exacerbates structural problems in the global rebar market including continued excess steel making capacity. Both Stelco and Sidbec argued that, consistent with past observations by the Tribunal about the "economics of steel production", off-shore producers continually operate at high levels of production, even in times of over-supply or declining demand.²⁹ Stelco added that the major rebar producers in Asia, Europe and Middle East rely on the Chinese market to absorb large volumes of their production.³⁰ With respect to demand levels, both Stelco and Gerdau referred to industry reports which suggest that current Chinese demand rates are not likely to be sustained, leading to higher steel supplies and lower prices, both in North America and globally.³¹

[46] Stelco also referred to more recent developments in China, including the effects of Chinese government attempts to slow down their domestic economy. Stelco cited various reports from the January to June 2004 period, which it states provide evidence of current Chinese over-supply of long products, weakening in Chinese demand and prices, and increasing export offers.³² Sidbec also referred to price declines and the increase in inventories based on April and June 2004 market reports and the significant increase in exports from China to Canada of low-priced rebar as further evidence of those developments.³³

[47] Stelco expressed concerns that this over-supply of both Chinese rebar and exported rebar currently targeting the Chinese market could find its way to the wider export market.³⁴ Consistent with Stelco's arguments, Sidbec stated that current rebar market conditions in China will increase the pressure to expand sales to export markets (including Canada) leading to greater price competition and a resumption of dumping from the Named Countries.³⁵ Gerdau made similar claims and added that because of rising prices, North America is increasingly attractive for steel products. Gerdau added that the Canadian market is even more vulnerable because of the appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar.³⁶

[48] Regarding developments in North America, Stelco stated that increasing prices in North America are largely related to cost increases and that there continues to be pressures on the Canadian steel industry.³⁷ Sidbec stated that the size of the market in 2003 was almost 10% lower than 2000.³⁸ Stelco also remarked on this market trend and added that this is mirrored by domestic production, which in 2003, only shows a return to the production levels of the mid 1990's.³⁹ Stelco noted that while overall imports of rebar have largely declined from the countries subject to the two Tribunal findings, Turkey retains a significant interest in the Canadian market and has continued to export subject goods.⁴⁰

[49] Stelco and Sidbec stated that there are increased imports from non-subject sources.⁴¹ Stelco added that one of the most significant developments in the market is the pattern of Chinese rebar imports on the West coast. Stelco argued that this demonstrates that China is once again in a position to export and that sizeable volumes could be directed to North America.⁴² Sidbec stated that if the Rebar I finding was rescinded, Named Country imports would be dumped in order to compete with low-priced imports from other sources.⁴³

[50] Gerdau submitted that the evidence indicates that the producers in the Named Countries have continued to dump subject goods in Canada throughout the period during which the Rebar I finding has been in effect. Up until January 2004, when the CBSA's normal value methodology was changed, Gerdau claimed that the prices charged by foreign producers and exporters for subject goods did not increase at a rate corresponding to the increases in the cost of scrap and that foreign producers were able to take advantage of the prospective normal value system and continue to dump subject goods into Canada.⁴⁴

[51] The Canadian producers stated that the Named Countries have significant production capacity and substantial volumes of rebar for export. Both Stelco and Gerdau noted that the combined production capacity is many times larger than Canada's entire market for rebar.⁴⁵ Stelco stated that the sheer size of rebar production in the Named Countries reinforces the likelihood of resumed dumping should the Rebar I finding expire.

[52] The Canadian producers also submitted that the practices of the importers, brokers and traders of imported rebar facilitate the sourcing and importation of dumped goods. Stelco noted that past Tribunal findings confirmed that these enterprises are adept at sourcing and importing steel at bargain prices, seriously eroding domestic prices through these practices.⁴⁶ Sidbec referred to the "highly destabilizing" marketing practices of these parties, as described by the Tribunal in a prior ruling.⁴⁷ Sidbec also referred to the practice of source-switching and states that these same importers turned to new sources of dumped rebar imports following the Rebar I finding to those countries eventually covered by the Rebar II finding.⁴⁸

[53] The Canadian producers submitted that the evidence relating to numerous dumping actions and other trade remedies by Canadian authorities and other jurisdictions on the same goods and other steel products against the Named Countries demonstrates a propensity to dump.⁴⁹ Sidbec added that the various trade remedies in place against these countries make diversion of substantial volumes of subject goods to Canada inevitable if the Rebar I finding is rescinded and that dumping will arise because of increased price competition.⁵⁰

[54] Stelco also noted that rebar is a basic commodity that competes on the basis of price.⁵¹ Stelco and Gerdau added that dumped imports can rapidly take up volume and market share as evidenced by past experience with the Rebar I finding and subsequent Rebar II finding.⁵² Stelco stated that experience with price-convergence means that dumped imports will be priced to the lowest offered price at the time if the Rebar I finding lapses.⁵³ Sidbec added that if imports from the Named Countries are to compete with imports in the Canadian market, it is with lower priced non-named country imports that they will have to compete.⁵⁴

[55] Stelco and Sidbec submitted that there is only a small sampling of information available from responding exporters and this is not sufficient to counter the information provided by the domestic industry regarding the likelihood of resumed dumping from the Named Countries.⁵⁵

Positions of the Canadian Producers - Country Specific

Cuba

[56] Stelco stated that Cuban rebar production has been as high as 236,000 tonnes in previous years despite reported production of only 90,000 tonnes in 2002. Stelco submitted that this is significant because of statements from the Cuban exporter, Acinox, that it hopes to increase export volumes if producer capacity increases. Stelco added that Cuba has few proximate markets other than Canada and Mexico.⁵⁶

[57] Gerdau, consistent with arguments against the other Named Countries, submitted that import prices from Cuba during the POR were lower or comparable to previously determined dumped prices and did not reflect corresponding cost increases for scrap incurred over the same period.⁵⁷

Korea

[58] Gerdau and Stelco noted the large production capacity of rebar producers in Korea,⁵⁸ estimated at 10.9 million tonnes and stated that the steel mills in Korea have an even greater capacity to produce rebar than those in Turkey.

[59] Sidbec referred to recent press reports that rebar pricing continues to fall, in part due to slowdowns in the construction sector in Korea. Sidbec submitted that this information about weakening domestic demand in Korea suggests there will be increased exports from Korea, as well as a high probability of resumed dumping.⁵⁹

[60] Gerdau stated that imports of rebar from Korea were dumped during the POR. Gerdau noted that steel producers in Korea purchase their scrap in world markets and have been equally affected by rapidly rising scrap prices. Similarly, Gerdau submitted that prices of imports from Korea during the POR were lower or comparable to previously determined dumped prices and did not reflect corresponding cost increases for scrap incurred over the same period.⁶⁰

Turkey

[61] The Canadian producers stated that Turkey has substantial rebar production capacity⁶¹ with production, as of 2002, estimated at 6.9 million tonnes annually.

[62] The Canadian producers also submitted that Turkey is heavily reliant on exports⁶², noting that exports exceeded 3.9 million tonnes in 2003. In addition, Sidbec provided evidence that three of the Turkish respondents exported a significant majority of their total rebar sales during the POR, and added that Ekinciler, which restarted production in February 2004, aims to export 80% of its extensive production capacity.⁶³

[63] Stelco submitted that because of export orientation, and the importance of the Canadian market, there is incentive for Turkish producers to increase their exports to North America if the Rebar I finding is revoked because North American prices for rebar are currently significantly higher than third country prices.⁶⁴

[64] In response to conflicting claims between the Canadian producers and Turkish respondents about Turkish utilization rates, Stelco stated that the likelihood of resumed dumping is more related to the high volumes of Turkish production and heavy reliance on export markets.⁶⁵

[65] Stelco added that, consistent with the price convergence argument, Turkish producers will have to resort to resumed dumping to compete with the lowest price in the market.⁶⁶

[66] Gerdau claimed that up until the end of January 2004, when the CBSA normal value methodology was changed, the prices charged by Turkish producers and exporters for subject goods during the POR did not increase at a rate corresponding to the increases in the cost of scrap. Therefore, Turkish producers were able to take advantage of the prospective normal value system and continue to dump subject goods into Canada.⁶⁷

[67] Stelco also stated that the Turkish producers appear to have taken advantage of fluctuations in scrap prices to exploit the prospective normal value system in place prior to January 2004,⁶⁸ adding that the pricing data provided by the individual Turkish respondents should be discounted.⁶⁹

[68] Regarding the issue of cumulation,⁷⁰ Stelco stated that the likelihood of resumed dumping from Turkey requires the assessment of the overall impact of the subject goods on the domestic market as a whole.⁷¹

Parties contending that Continued or Resumed Dumping is Unlikely

Positions of the Turkish Producers

[69] Of the five Turkish exporters that provided a response to the exporter ERQ, only Ekinciler did not provide a case argument or a reply submission.⁷² Habas, Colakoglu, Icdas and Diler⁷³ (herein referred to as the Turkish producers) submitted a joint case argument and reply submission.

[70] The Turkish producers submitted that the expiry of the Rebar I finding with respect to Turkey is unlikely to result in the resumption of dumping of concrete reinforcing bar into Canada. The resumption of dumping is unlikely due to four factors:⁷⁴

• fundamental changes in the rebar markets;
• performance of the Turkish producers;
• the ability of Turkish companies to sell in Canada at undumped prices; and
• the positive forecast for the rebar market.

[71] The Turkish producers stated that the worldwide market conditions for rebar since 1999 have changed. The domestic market conditions in Canada that resulted in the Rebar I finding and subsequent Rebar II finding are now different. The factors that led to the two anti-dumping investigations have disappeared.

[72] The Turkish producers noted that prior to the Rebar I finding, the global economy had been hit with the Asian crisis, the Japanese economic slowdown and the collapse of the Russian and commonwealth of Independent states.⁷⁵ They also stated that these factors, among others, led to an increase of steel exports to Canada.

[73] The Turkish producers commented that the increase in imports into Canada led to pressure on rebar prices in the Canadian market. They also noted that the Tribunal commented on this fact in the Statement of Reasons for the Rebar I finding, where in the period preceding the inquiry, Canadian domestic prices and Turkish import prices were declining.⁷⁶ The Turkish producers also noted the Tribunal indicated that the low rebar prices in Canada were caused by a combination of a weak global economy and the collapse of the international scrap market.⁷⁷

[74] The Turkish producers stated that there have been fundamental changes since 2000 to both the international scrap market and the international rebar market. They noted that after the Tribunal's Rebar I finding and Rebar II finding, most of the Named Countries left the Canadian rebar market and imports are now supplied by imports from Turkey, China and the United States of America (United States).⁷⁸ In addition, the Turkish producers note that the majority of imports from China and the United States are for consumption in western Canada, while the Turkish imports are mainly for the eastern Canadian market.

[75] The Turkish producers also argued that based on the import patterns, it appears that there is price competition between the Chinese and United States origin goods in western Canada, while in eastern Canada, Turkey is the only main importer and they do not face price competition from other imports. They also stated that this position is supported by the fact that Turkish import prices are now higher than the United States import prices.⁷⁹

[76] The Turkish producers concluded that they have been able to maintain a presence in the Canadian market, without lowering their prices.⁸⁰ They contended that there is evidence on the record that indicates that rebar prices for the Canadian and Turkish producers have increased each year during the POR, with the largest price increases in late 2003 and 2004.⁸¹ They also stated that the information on the record indicates that current Canadian producer prices are lower than the current domestic and export prices of the Turkish producers. Based on this evidence there would be no incentive for the Turkish producers to lower their prices or dump their goods into the Canadian market place.⁸²

[77] The Turkish producers noted that Turkish imports were able to maintain a presence in the Canadian market place during the POR at undumped prices.⁸³ They also noted that they were able to maintain this market presence regardless of the market dynamics in the international rebar market.⁸⁴

[78] Habas, Colakoglu and Icdas all submitted that rebar is a profitable business for their companies and this is reflected in the fact that their normal values are based on profitable domestic sales data.^{85 86 87} They also stated that all of their export sales have been made above cost.^{88 89 90}

[79] Habas noted that their production capacity had not changed during the POR, but capacity utilization had increased due to increased demand for rebar and other long products.⁹¹ Habas also noted that export sales to Canada are a small percentage of their total overall sales and that during the POR a greater percentage of the increased production was directed to the domestic and other export markets.

[80] Colakoglu stated that their production capacity had not changed during the POR and that they are operating at 100% utilization.⁹² Regarding the Canadian market, Colakoglu noted that they only had exports to Canada in 2003 and it represented a small percentage of their total export sales.

[81] Icdas noted that their production capacity increased in the first quarter of 2004 with the addition of a new production facility and they are currently operating at an effective utilization rate of 100%.⁹³ Icdas stated that exports to Canada represent a small percentage of their total export sales and this figure is declining, as demand increases in other export markets.

[82] The Turkish producers argued that since they sell at a profit in the domestic and export markets and since they are all operating at high utilization rates, there is no likelihood of resumed dumping.

[83] The Turkish producers noted that all economic forecasts foresee strong global economic growth. For Canada they noted that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that Canada will experience growth through 2005,⁹⁴ while for China, growth is expected to be double that of the world economy and should be sustained.⁹⁵

[84] The Turkish producers stated that with the forecasted increase in global economic growth, demand for steel and rebar has been forecasted to rise.⁹⁶ They also commented that construction activity in Canada is projected to average 5% growth for the next two years.⁹⁷ Further, the Turkish producers noted that Gerdau in their 2003 Annual Report commented on the current state of the steel market in North America and the fact that there is an apparent shortage of steel worldwide.⁹⁸ In the United States market, the Turkish producers noted that construction activity is forecasted to grow by 7% during the next two years and continue to remain strong for several additional years.⁹⁹

[85] In addition, the Turkish producers argued that demand for rebar in Turkey's traditional markets in the Middle East and the Gulf Region are also forecasted to increase.¹⁰⁰ Regarding China, they claimed that reports that the Chinese economy was heading into a slowdown and the steel bubble was about to burst have been exaggerated. They also argued that the fundamentals for strong Chinese growth are still in place and that growth in construction will remain strong leading up to the Olympics in 2008.¹⁰¹

[86] On the domestic front in Turkey, the Turkish producers noted that significant public investment on infrastructure projects are planned for the next two years.¹⁰²

[87] The Turkish producers stated that the global price for rebar has increased because of demand pressures and increases in ferrous scrap pricing. Given that global rebar prices are forecasted to remain strong, they argued that there would be no incentive for the Turkish producers to reduce their prices to the Canadian market.¹⁰³

[88] The Turkish producers noted that they are the largest offshore source of rebar to Canada, they face no pricing pressures from other sources and that their export prices to Canada are higher than the Canadian domestic producers' prices. The Turkish producers argued that given that the global and Canadian rebar markets have never been so strong and that the demand for construction steel products is forecasted to continue until 2006, there is no need to reduce prices or dump the goods in Canada, especially since Norambar has not been able to meet the demand of its customers for bars, rebar and billets.¹⁰⁴

[89] In their reply submission, the Turkish producers noted that all of the Canadian producers argued that anti-dumping measures in other jurisdictions support the likelihood of resumed dumping. However, the Turkish producers pointed out that the majority of the injury findings quoted cover a period of time when the steel market was not as robust as today's market.¹⁰⁵

[90] Regarding the Canadian producer's argument that demand for steel in China will decline, the Turkish producers noted that the Canadian producers did not state when this reversal would take place. However, the Turkish producers argued that, based on information on the record, it appears that demand for construction steel in China is stable and that rebar prices will remain strong.¹⁰⁶ The Turkish producers also noted that the Chinese demand for ferrous scrap will continue to be strong and keep prices high and will also impact the price for rebar.¹⁰⁷

[91] In response to Stelco's and Gerdau's case arguments on production capacity, the Turkish producers stated that the President should not determine rebar production capacity without taking into account the production of other products produced on the same equipment.¹⁰⁸ In response to Stelco's concerns regarding Turkish production capacity, the Turkish producers replied that their collective production capacity is more than a sampling and that their performance in the Canadian market should be considered to be representative of the other Turkish producers.¹⁰⁹

[92] Concerning the role of vendors in export sales, the Turkish producers noted that in the CBSA's enforcement of the Rebar I finding, export prices have always been determined on the basis of the exporter selling price, which means that the exporter's selling price is less than the importer's purchase price. The Turkish producers argued that this indicates that the vendors were able to mark up their sales to the importers in Canada at undumped prices. Regarding Stelco's comments on the export orientation of the Turkish industry, the Turkish producers noted that there is evidence on the record that shows that there is increased demand in other export markets as well as their domestic market. Further, the Turkish producers argued that they currently do not face low-price competition from non-named countries in Canada as indicated by their increasing export prices to Canada.¹¹⁰

[93] The Turkish producers noted that Gerdau discussed in detail that Turkish rebar was dumped during the POR. The Turkish producers stated that there is no evidence on the record that Turkish rebar was dumped during the POR.¹¹¹

[94] In response to Sidbec's comments that there was no recent evidence that the Named Countries could compete at undumped prices, the Turkish producers noted that the President conducts the analysis on a country-by-country basis. With respect to Turkey, the Turkish producers noted that there is evidence on the administrative record that Turkish imports have been exported to Canada in 2004.¹¹² Regarding Sidbec's argument that Turkey would have to compete against imports from China and the United States, the Turkish producers noted that these imports were destined for the western Canada market and do not compete with the Turkish imports.¹¹³ The Turkish producers reminded the President about the difference in timing of domestic sales versus export sales in response to Sidbec's conclusions when comparing average per tonne prices in the Turkish domestic market, the Canadian and other export markets.¹¹⁴

[95] In conclusion, the Turkish producers maintained that the resumption of dumping from Turkey is unlikely, due to the continued demand for construction steel, the lack of pricing pressures on Turkish rebar in the Canadian market and their ability to compete during the POR in the Canadian market at undumped prices.¹¹⁵

CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS

[96] Subsection 76.03(7) of the SIMA requires the President of the CBSA to determine whether the expiry of the order or finding in respect of the goods of a country or countries is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping or subsidizing of the goods. When making this determination, the President may consider the factors set out in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR.

[97] Guided by the factors in the aforementioned SIMR and based on the documentation submitted by the various participants and the consideration of the information on the administrative record, the ensuing list represents a summary of the analysis:

• The fact that rebar is a commodity product and is sold on the basis of price;
• The importance of ferrous scrap in the production of rebar and the impact of rising ferrous scrap prices;
• Market conditions in Canada;
• The effect of low-price offerings for rebar to the Canadian market from non-named countries;
• The volume of importations of rebar at non-dumped prices from the Named Countries while the Rebar I finding has been in place;
• Global production capacity for rebar - excess supply and potential excess;
• The apparent size of the Canadian rebar market compared to the global production capacity;
• Consumption trends for rebar in the world and in the Named Countries;
• Exporters' reliance on export markets to maintain production levels;
• Trade measures taken by other countries in respect of similar goods exported by some of the Named Countries;
• The risk of diversion due to potential trade measures.

[98] Before presenting a country-by-country analysis on the issue of the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping, there are certain issues that relate to the subject goods on a broader scale. In particular, the following issues are addressed: developments in the ferrous scrap market; market conditions in China; market conditions in Canada; rebar pricing considerations; and whether there has been dumping from the Named Countries.

Ferrous Scrap Market

[99] Rebar is produced using ferrous scrap metal as the principal raw material.¹¹⁶ Ferrous scrap metal is melted in an electric arc furnace (EAF), processed in a ladle arc-refining unit, cast into rectangular billets and then rolled into various sizes of rebar. Therefore, what happens in the international ferrous scrap market will have a direct impact on the international rebar market.

[100] Ferrous scrap is considered a commodity product, like rebar,¹¹⁷ and is typically denominated in United States dollars in the global market. In North America and around the world, the ferrous scrap market experienced a dramatic surge in pricing at the end of 2003.¹¹⁸ In North America, Canadian steel producers compete for scrap with their United States counterparts and offshore purchasers. In addition, Canada is also a major exporter of ferrous scrap to the United States.¹¹⁹

[101] Based on information from the trade magazine Metal Bulletin, the pricing of ferrous scrap in the North America and European markets has been similar during the POR, as detailed in the following table.

Table 2: Average Pricing of Ferrous Scrap during the POR

Pricing in Ferrous Market	Unit Price per metric tonne US$ Shredded FOB Rotterdam	Percentage increase from 2001	Unit price per metric tonne US$ Shredded FOB United States East Coast	Percentage increase from 2001
Year 2001	$83.86	0%	$84.37	0%
Year 2002	$105.41	26%	$107.76	28%
Year 2003	$146.94	75%	$140.51	67%
1st quarter 2004	$236.92	183%	$193.08	129%

Source: Exhibit 19 Metal Bulletin ferrous scrap price archives
US$ - United States dollars
FOB - Free on Board

[102] As indicated in the aforementioned table, the price of ferrous scrap has increased dramatically since 2001, while it has surged in price in both the European and North American markets during the first quarter of 2004.

[103] In North America, there are several factors that account for the dramatic price increase of ferrous scrap: unprecedented demand from China coupled with strong domestic demand; a weak United States dollar which has increased foreign buying power of off shore purchasers;¹²⁰ a shortage of coking coal and iron ore which has caused operators of blast oxygen furnaces (BOFs)¹²¹ to use more scrap for raw material and, therefore, compete with operators of EAFs.^{122 123} Due to the global nature of the steel and ferrous scrap market, these same factors are also affecting the European market for ferrous scrap.¹²⁴

[104] The increased worldwide demand for ferrous scrap, in addition to higher prices, has also created a shortage, or the perception of a shortage, of ferrous scrap.¹²⁵ In response to this, some countries have resorted to implementing export controls to ensure that their domestic producers have an adequate supply of ferrous scrap. Currently, Ukraine, the Russia Federation (Russia), the Republic of Belarus, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Korea have some form of export controls on ferrous scrap, such as, a tariff, export quota or an export license.¹²⁶ However, the current high prices for ferrous scrap have made these export controls less effective. For example, a January 2004 article from Recycling Today, indicated that even with the controls in place there has been an increase in ferrous scrap shipments from Russia and Ukraine.¹²⁷

[105] At the other end of the spectrum in terms of controlling scrap supplies is China, which is currently in the process of establishing an import license regime for ferrous scrap. Officially known as the quality supervision, inspection, and quarantine license (import license) it is being introduced for health and safety and environmental concerns.¹²⁸ Regardless of the reason for the import license, China is a major purchaser in the international ferrous scrap market and if the demand for scrap from China slows for any reason, then international scrap prices will be impacted.¹²⁹

[106] Ferrous scrap is an important raw material input in the manufacture of rebar and accounts for approximately 65% of the total cost of production.¹³⁰ The ferrous scrap market and the concrete reinforcing market are inextricably linked. The dramatic surge in ferrous scrap prices can be explained, in part by the United States and global economic rebound, but China is a key driving force behind the surge in raw material pricing¹³¹ for steel production. Clearly, what happens in China will affect the market dynamics for both ferrous scrap and rebar.

Market Conditions in China

[107] China remains the wildcard in terms of the world steel situation and evidence on the record indicates that developments in China will continue to be decisive in terms of their effect on supply, demand and prices in global steel markets.

[108] China is the world's largest steel producer, recording production growth of over 20% in 2003 with output reaching more than 220 million tonnes, or close to one quarter of global steel production of 945.1 million tonnes.¹³² In addition, it is projected that China will account for almost 29% of world steel consumption in 2004 and more than 30% in 2005.¹³³

[109] China has also been absorbing significant volumes of imports, and is now the world's largest importer of steel products, with total imports in 2003 estimated at over 43 million tonnes.¹³⁴

[110] As the major driver in steel industry activity, China is also transforming the dynamics of raw material supplies and prices. It has attracted significant volumes of raw materials, stretching the availability of supplies, leading to higher prices. Recent Chinese government measures to cool down their economy have added to pricing volatility and resulted in significant price fluctuations in world prices for key inputs.

[111] With respect to ferrous scrap, over the last three years, China has become the leading overseas destination for ferrous scrap, the major input in the production of rebar products. As with other raw materials, ferrous scrap prices have been volatile. After more than doubling in the 9-month period ending March 2004,¹³⁵ there has been significant softening in scrap prices coincident with the absence of major buyers, including China and Turkey, from the markets.¹³⁶ There are suggestions that ferrous scrap prices are likely to rebound in the second half of the 2004 with the return of major buying activity.¹³⁷

[112] After recording economic growth of 9.1% in 2003, the Chinese economy generated an annual growth rate of 9.7% in the first quarter of 2004.¹³⁸ This growth includes significant increases in new steel making capacity, fuelled in large part by surging steel prices. Fixed assets investment in the steel sector totalled approximately 16.1 U.S. billion dollars in 2003, an increase of 87.6% when compared to 2002.¹³⁹ In the first quarter 2004, steel output capacity grew by 16 million tonnes and steel production rose to 67 million tonnes, up over 29% from the same period the previous year.¹⁴⁰

[113] The National Development and Reform Commission predicts China's annual steel production capacity will reach 330 million tonnes by 2005, if current projects underway are completed. Domestic steel demand in China is not expected to reach 330 million tonnes until 2010. Experts and government officials have widely reported that overheated investment will result in massive overcapacity within the steel industry.¹⁴¹

[114] The sector of the steel industry in China that has expanded the most dramatically in recent years is low value added steel products, which are produced using EAF technology, used for construction applications. With respect to projected new EAF capacity, varied figures have been reported. The April 2004 Metal Bulletin Monthly states that EAF capacity will increase by 7 million tonnes by 2010 as 15 more EAFs come on stream.¹⁴² Another industry report indicates that sharp increases in competing raw material inputs have impacted investment decisions and will result in some 20 million tonnes of EAF capacity in China.¹⁴³

[115] In response to the overheating economy including excess growth in fixed asset investment, the central government of China (Chinese government) has issued a series of warnings to the business community and introduced a series of restraint measures including specific efforts targeted at the steel industry.¹⁴⁴ The measures and restrictions cover economic planning, banking, financing and land management, and are intended to stop "reckless investment" in redundant and haphazard projects.¹⁴⁵

[116] Despite measures by the Chinese government, there are reports in May and June of 2004 indicating that efforts to dampen growth in investment and steel demand have had little effect and stronger measures could be used.¹⁴⁶ This adds to the reported doubts about the Chinese government's ability to rein in the economy and leads to concerns that stronger measures, including more aggressive credit tightening, could stall the Chinese economy. Some reports suggest that if these stronger measures succeed, both local and overseas producers could face declining demand just as production from Chinese steelmakers increases.¹⁴⁷

[117] Consistent with the uncertainty surrounding developments in China, other industry experts suggest that the Chinese bubble will not burst and steel production and demand will remain strong, despite the recent price slide, based on continued economic growth.¹⁴⁸

[118] There are reports that Chinese steel production for construction applications have already increased to the point where supply exceeds demand. Specifically, industry reports indicate that in 2003, China was already in surplus in three types of carbon steel products, including wire rod, merchant bar and rebar. These carbon steel products represent half of the country's apparent consumption of steel. This contrasts with China's steel sheet segment, including hot rolled coil, cold rolled coil and zinc coated sheet, where the country continues to have a shortfall. It should be noted that China's long product mills have increased their output substantially in 2003. Shipments of steel rod and bar from domestic mills have increased by an estimated 12 million tonnes and total output exceeded domestic consumption by about 1 million tonnes.¹⁴⁹

[119] Following an expansion in rebar production by 29% in the first two months of 2004, Chinese inventory levels have risen significantly throughout the first quarter and inventory levels are far above historic levels.¹⁵⁰ Further to these developments, the long products sector which includes rebar, has been experiencing demand and price weakening. According to industry reports, rising domestic production is going into inventory with a consequent "knock-on" effect on prices and there are increasing amounts of export offers.¹⁵¹ In addition to re-exports of incoming steel shipments, there are indications that Chinese producers are turning to export markets, causing price pressures in these markets.¹⁵² Reports as recent as June 11, 2004, noted the negative effects on international rebar prices caused by the Chinese downturn.¹⁵³

[120] Chinese rebar producers have also recently made price offers for significant tonnages to Canada at very low prices as per import permit data from International Trade Canada.¹⁵⁴ Specifically, import permit data shows price offers to Canada of over 25,000 tonnes in April and May of 2004. Over half of this tonnage, almost 15,000 tonnes, was offered at prices of $375.00 per tonne, well below current international and Canadian market prices for rebar.

[121] In summary, while future developments in China can best be described as uncertain and unpredictable, recent evidence demonstrates that minor shifts in market conditions in China have wide ranging effects on other international markets including Canada. This is particularly true for a commodity product like rebar, which is likely to be one of the first steel products to be affected in an economic downturn.

[122] Similarly, given the apparent excess supply of and significant capacity for rebar in China, coupled with an expected slowdown in demand in key sectors such as real estate and construction, and the recent evidence of low-priced sales to various export markets including Canada, it is likely that there will be additional sales of aggressively priced export offerings from China in the near future.

[123] Ultimately, the strong possibility of recurring weakness in the Chinese long products sector is expected to act as a continued pricing threat in global markets including North America.

Market Conditions in Canada

[124] Based on information on the administrative record for the POR, the CBSA has estimated the total Canadian market for rebar at 596,707 tonnes for the year 2001, 688,832 tonnes for the year 2002 and 745,920 tonnes for the year 2003. There was insufficient data to project the estimated market for the year 2004, since only data relating to the first quarter was collected and the busiest season for rebar is during the months of April to October.¹⁵⁵

[125] Based on full year data that has been collected on the apparent market, there has been a steady increase in demand during the POR. The data indicates that the apparent market in the year 2003 was 25% larger than the base year of 2001.

[126] There is evidence on the record that indicates that the demand for rebar in Canada will continue to be stable during the remainder of the year 2004 and could then moderate in the year 2005. The majority of the construction activity is related to government infrastructure projects and private sector non-residential construction projects.¹⁵⁶ Rebar is a commodity product and as noted by the Tribunal in the Rebar I finding, "price trends in one part of the world generally influence prices in other parts of the world, especially for a commodity-type product such as rebar, and that the Canadian market is not and cannot be insulated from world price pressures".¹⁵⁷

Rebar Pricing - Cost Effect or Demand Pull

[127] There is plenty of evidence on the record regarding the current pricing of rebar in Canada and the world. The information indicates that rebar prices are increasing and that increasing ferrous scrap costs and demand for rebar are influencing that pricing. Based on the CBSA's analysis, it appears that concrete rebar prices are being primarily driven by the increase in ferrous scrap prices and that demand factors are secondary, regardless of where the producers source their ferrous scrap material. For additional details on this analysis refer to Appendix A.

Import Pricing from the Named Countries

[128] The Canadian industry has commented that imports from the Named Countries continued to be dumped during the POR.¹⁵⁸ However there is no evidence on the record that any of the Named Countries have dumped the subject goods into Canada during the POR.¹⁵⁹

[129] It is CBSA policy that under normal circumstances, normal values will not be applied retroactively. However, normal values will be applied retroactively in cases where the parties have not advised the CBSA in a timely manner of substantial changes that affect normal values for the purposes of SIMA. Therefore, where substantial changes occur in prices, market conditions or costs associated with the production and sale of the goods, the onus is on the concerned parties to advise the CBSA.

[130] In the course of the CBSA's last re-investigation¹⁶⁰ of normal values and export prices of the subject goods, specific normal values were determined for imports of the subject goods during the period of the re-investigation and these normal values were compared to the corresponding export prices of the goods during that period. In all cases, the export prices of the subject goods were found to be higher than the normal values and therefore there was no need to apply anti-dumping duties retroactively. The CBSA is satisfied that there was no dumping of the subject goods during this period.

[131] At the conclusion of a re-investigation it is also normal CBSA policy to issue normal values for future importations of subject goods into Canada. However, in this case there had been a dramatic change in the price of the raw materials necessary for steel-making, especially ferrous scrap, since the end of the period of the re-investigation, September 30, 2003.¹⁶¹ It was evident that the information collected on costing and domestic sales was no longer representative of the current conditions and it would be inappropriate to base future normal values on this outdated information.

[132] Accordingly, at the conclusion of the re-investigation the CBSA provided the cooperating exporters from Turkey and Cuba with detailed instructions on how to obtain specific normal values for each shipment of subject goods released on or after January 29, 2004.

Analysis by Country

Cuba

[133] The only Cuban steel producer, Acinox provided a partial response to the exporter ERQ. Acinox cooperated in the most recent re-investigation of normal values and export prices that was concluded on January 29, 2004, and they were provided with a methodology to obtain normal values.

[134] During the POR, Acinox shipped subject goods from Cuba to Canada, which indicates that the Cuban producer has maintained an interest in the Canadian market. In 2003, Acinox had limited shipments to Canada and no shipments in the first quarter of 2004.¹⁶² The fact that there have been no importations since 2003, considered in light of the factors below, seems to indicate an inability to compete in the Canadian market at undumped prices starting in 2003.

[135] In the absence of complete information on production and sales data from Acinox, the CBSA's analysis relied on production and sales information from several sources on the record, the Tribunal and the International Iron and Steel Institute.

[136] In 2002, it was estimated that Acinox produced 90,000 tonnes rebar, down from a peak production level of 236,000 tonnes in 1998.¹⁶³ Based on this data, it appears that Acinox has excess production capacity of approximately 146,000 tonnes. This is equivalent to approximately 20% of the total apparent Canadian market¹⁶⁴ for rebar in 2003. It is also equal to approximately 49% of the total imports into Canada in 2003 of rebar, from Named Countries and other sources.¹⁶⁵

[137] The main markets for Acinox's exports of rebar are the Caribbean and Central American regions, which they described as under developed with serious economic problems.¹⁶⁶ Besides these markets, other potential attractive markets for Cuban exports would be Canada and Mexico. Due to the United States trade embargo, Cuba has restricted trade with the Untied States.¹⁶⁷ During the POR, rebar exports to Canada represented 4% of Acinox's total rebar exports.¹⁶⁸

[138] While there are no other anti-dumping cases on Cuban rebar that would indicate a pattern of dumping, it was determined in the Tribunal's original injury investigation that in 1998, exports to Canada accounted for approximately 33% of Acinox's total rebar exports.¹⁶⁹ A review of the import statistics collected for the original anti-dumping investigation indicates that, in 1996 and 1997, there were no imports into Canada from Cuba of the subject goods. For 1998, the import statistics show that imports into Canada from Cuba were 2,974 tonnes or about 1% of total imports of the subject goods from the Named Countries and other sources. During the first three months of 1999, Cuban imports were 3,640 tonnes, or approximately 10% of total imports of subject goods from the Named Countries and other sources.¹⁷⁰

[139] Based on these statistics, it appears that if an opportunity arises, Acinox is capable of and willing to increase their shipments of rebar to export markets, even at dumped prices.¹⁷¹

[140] Given the above, the current pricing pressures in the Canadian rebar market, the fact that rebar is a commodity product and Acinox's export orientation, it appears that if they were to resume exporting the subject goods to Canada, they would likely have to be at dumped prices in order to be competitive.

[141] Based on evidence contained on the record including: an interest in the Canadian market; the apparent inability to compete in Canada at undumped prices, the apparent low utilization of rebar production capacity; a willingness to increase exports if an opportunity arises; and the potential diversion resulting from trade measures taken by the United States, the President determined that the expiry of the Rebar I finding was likely to result in the resumption of dumping into Canada of certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from Cuba.

Korea

[142] No Korean producers provided any information for the President to consider in making a determination. Only one Korean exporter, Dongkuk, participated in the re-investigation of the normal values and export prices that was concluded on February 5, 2001. However, no Korean exporters cooperated in the re-investigation of normal values and export prices that was concluded on January 29, 2004. Accordingly, there are currently no normal values in place for subject goods from Korea.

[143] During the POR, there were shipments of subject goods from Korea, when Dongkuk had specific normal values in place.¹⁷² However, there have been no shipments to Canada of Korean origin rebar since 2002.¹⁷³ The fact that there have been no importations from Korea since 2002, considered in light of the factors below, seems to indicate an inability to compete in the Canadian market at undumped prices starting in 2002.

[144] In the absence of submissions from any Korean producers of rebar, the CBSA's analysis relied on information from several sources on the record, including the Tribunal, Metal Bulletin and the International Iron and Steel Institute.

[145] In 2002, Korea was one of the top producers of rebar in the world, second only to China.¹⁷⁴ Evidence on the record indicates that between 2000 and 2002, Korean producers increased their rebar production from 9.5 million tonnes to 10.9 million tonnes, an increase of 14%. A Metal Bulletin article reported that in 2003, Korea produced 11.4 million tonnes of rebar and only exported 11,600 tonnes.¹⁷⁵

[146] It appears that the Korean producers of rebar are currently running at full capacity.¹⁷⁶ The implied domestic consumption for rebar, based on data from the Tribunal, ranges from approximately 93% of capacity in 1999, to 97% in 2000,¹⁷⁷ though in 2003 it appears to have been 99%. Nonetheless, if domestic demand does not remain strong, Korean producers will have significant volumes available for export, when compared to the apparent Canadian market.¹⁷⁸ For example, using a 97% domestic consumption level, the Korean exporters would still have over 328,000 tonnes of rebar available for export. This is equivalent to approximately 44% of the total apparent Canadian market for rebar in 2003.¹⁷⁹ In addition, the amount available for export would be slightly larger than the total imports into Canada of rebar, from the Named Countries and other sources in 2003.¹⁸⁰

[147] Korean steel producers have exhibited a history of export dependency and dumping steel products. Besides the Rebar I finding, there are Canadian anti-dumping measures in place with respect to other steel products from Korea including stainless steel round bar, structural tubing and steel pipe.¹⁸¹

[148] In the United States, there are currently anti-dumping measures in place with respect to rebar, concrete steel wire rod and concrete steel wire strand from Korea, which limits access to the United States market.¹⁸² In addition, the United States also has anti-dumping actions on 12 other steel products from Korea.¹⁸³ Korea is also subject to anti-dumping measures from 12 other counties covering 10 additional steel products.¹⁸⁴

[149] Based on data from MEPS International,¹⁸⁵ building investment in Korea peaked during 2003 and is forecasted to decrease in 2004 and demand for long products is down in 2004 but pricing has remained stable due to the increased cost of raw materials.¹⁸⁶ An article from the Metal Bulletin noted that current trends concerning the rebar market in Korea indicate that demand was expected to remain strong for the first half of 2004 and then slow in the second half of the year.¹⁸⁷

[150] This forecasted slow down in the second half of 2004 will be a concern to the Korean producers of rebar. If the demand for long products drops from the peak in 2003, then Korean steel producers will need to export excess production to keep utilization rates high. However, the exit by the Korean producers from their export markets in 2003 will mean that they will have to be persuasive with pricing in order to win back their export customers, especially where commodity products like rebar are concerned.

[151] This pattern of using export markets to ensure high utilization rates was witnessed in the original anti-dumping investigation where the Korean rebar producers had minimal exports to Canada in 1997 and then in 1998 they jumped to 34,002 tonnes, accounting for almost 16% of total imports from the Named Countries and other sources.¹⁸⁸

[152] Given the above, the current pricing pressures in the Canadian rebar market, the fact that rebar is a commodity product and Korean producers' export dependency to ensure high utilization rates, it appears that if they were to resume exporting the subject goods to Canada, they would likely have to be at dumped prices in order to be competitive.

[153] Based on evidence contained on the record including: an interest in the Canadian market; the apparent inability to compete in Canada at undumped prices; the significant Korean production capability for rebar; anti-dumping measures in place in the United States on rebar from Korea; anti-dumping measures on other Korean steel products in Canada and other countries, and a dependency on export markets to keep utilization rates high, the President determined that the expiry of the Rebar I finding was likely to result in the resumption of dumping into Canada of certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from Korea.

Turkey

[154] Of the five Turkish producers of rebar that provided information for purposes of the expiry review, only four, Colakoglu, Diler, Habas and Icdas participated in the CBSA's re-investigation of normal values and export prices that was concluded on January 29, 2004, and were provided with a methodology to obtain normal values.¹⁸⁹ Ekinciler did not participate in the last re-investigation of normal values and export prices as they had ceased¹⁹⁰ production of the subject goods in August 2000 and only resumed production in February 2004.¹⁹¹

[155] During the POR, the Turkish producers were able to sell to the Canadian market at non-dumped prices, demonstrating a continued interest in the Canadian market.¹⁹² However, import volumes from Turkey and the Turkish producers' share of the apparent Canadian market have declined since 2002.¹⁹³ This, when considered in light of the factors below, seems to indicate that they have not been able to compete against imports from non-named countries. Further, as no anti-dumping duty has been collected on the imports of rebar from Turkey during the POR, it would appear that the Rebar 1 finding is providing pricing discipline on the Turkish producers.

[156] Only three Turkish producers provided information regarding their rebar production for the POR. In 2002, the total production volume of rebar in Turkey, for all producers, was estimated at 6.9 million tonnes.¹⁹⁴ None of the five Turkish producers that responded to the exporter ERQs indicated that there were any plans to close any production facilities. As noted, Ekinciler resumed production in February 2004 and plans to produce 300,000 tonnes in 2004 and 700,000 tonnes in 2005, of which 80% is targeted to the export market.¹⁹⁵ It is apparent that the total production capability of the Turkish rebar producers is very significant when compared to the total Canadian market for rebar, which was estimated to be 745,920 tonnes for 2003.

[157] There is information on the record that the Turkish producers of long product were operating at or near to 70% utilization in the late 1990's and had been operating at that level for several years.¹⁹⁶ Based on information provided by three Turkish producers in their joint reply submission, they are all currently operating at very high utilization rates.

[158] However, there is evidence on the record that Turkey's rebar producers are highly dependent on exports to sustain their production levels. Based on data collected by the Tribunal during period 1996 to 2001, approximately 70% of the Turkish producers' sales of rebar were to the export markets.¹⁹⁷

[159] The importance of access to export markets was highlighted in a paper submitted in January 2002 to the United States government by Istanbul Minerals and Metal Exporters Association. In this submission, it was noted that rebar is one of the four most important Turkish steel exports to the United States over the past five years and "thus their export success is an important factor in the health of the steel industry".¹⁹⁸ The submission also noted that Turkey historically has had a surplus of long products and they are working to rationalize production that will lead to a reduction of exports of long products, but this reduction is expected to take a few years.¹⁹⁹

[160] It is also interesting to look at the timing of the United States trade action concerning rebar from Turkey.²⁰⁰ The Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping order covering rebar from Turkey on April 17, 1997, which corresponds to the time period where there was an increase in exports of the subject goods from Turkey to Canada.²⁰¹ As noted, the United States market is important for Turkish steel exports and once the trade action was implemented in the United States, Turkish exports were diverted to the Canadian market. This diversion of the Turkish subject goods ultimately lead to the initiation of the Canadian anti-dumping action in June 1999 and subsequent Rebar I finding that is the subject of this expiry review.

[161] In addition to the trade measures imposed by the United States, Turkish producers are also subject to anti-dumping measures on rebar from Egypt²⁰² and there is the possibility of a new trade action on rebar in the European Community.²⁰³ Turkish steel producers have also exhibited a history of dumping other steel products. Besides the trade measures on rebar, there are Canadian anti-dumping measures in place with respect to Turkey on cold-rolled steel sheet, carbon steel pipe and structural tubing.²⁰⁴ The United States has anti-dumping measures in place with respect to Turkey concerning carbon steel pipe in addition to the measures on rebar.²⁰⁵ Turkey is also subject to anti-dumping measures from two other countries covering five additional steel products.²⁰⁶

[162] Recently, the United States completed its sunset review of rebar from Turkey and it was determined that the revocation of the anti-dumping order would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping²⁰⁷ and to continuation or recurrence of material injury.²⁰⁸ The existence of this, and other trade actions, increases the likelihood that the Turkish producers would identify the non-protected markets as the primary destination for additional export sales in order to maintain high production levels. This would be especially true for the Turkish producers that are export dependent.

[163] Given the current pricing pressures in the Canadian rebar market, it appears that the Rebar I finding is providing pricing discipline concerning the Turkish producers' exports to Canada. If the pricing discipline was removed, and given the fact that rebar is a commodity product, it appears that the Turkish producers would likely have to sell at dumped prices in order to be competitive.

[164] Based on the evidence contained on the record including: the interest in the Canadian market, the large Turkish rebar production capacity and the reliance on export markets to maintain high productions levels, the export dependence due to insufficient domestic demand, a history of dumping rebar into the North American market, anti-dumping measures on other Turkish steel products in Canada and other countries, and the risk of diversion due to potential European anti-dumping measures on rebar from Turkey, the President determined that the expiry of the Rebar I finding was likely to result in the resumption of dumping into Canada of certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from Turkey.

CONCLUSION

[165] For purposes of making a determination in this expiry review, the CBSA conducted its analysis within the scope of the factors set forth in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR. Based on the foregoing consideration of pertinent factors and analysis of evidence on the record, on August 26, 2004, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency determined that the expiry of the finding by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal made on January 12, 2000, in Inquiry No. NQ-99-002, concerning certain concrete reinforcing bar was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey.

FUTURE ACTION

[166] On August 27, 2004, the Tribunal commenced its inquiry to determine whether the continued or resumed dumping is likely to result in injury or retardation with respect to goods from the Named Countries if the finding were allowed to expire. The Tribunal will make its decision by January 11, 2005.

[167] If the Tribunal determines that the expiry of the finding with respect to goods from the Named Countries is likely to result in injury or retardation, the finding will be continued in respect of those goods, with or without amendment. If this is the case, the CBSA will continue to levy anti-dumping duty on dumped importations of certain concrete reinforcing bar.

[168] If the Tribunal determines that the expiry of the finding with respect to the goods from the Named Countries is unlikely to result in injury or retardation, the finding will be rescinded in respect of those goods. Anti-dumping duty would no longer be levied on importations of certain concrete reinforcing bar beginning on the date the finding is rescinded.

INFORMATION

For further information, please contact Richard Pragnell at:

Mail	Canada Border Services Agency Anti-dumping and Countervailing Directorate 100 Metcalfe Street, 10th Floor Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0L5  Canada
Telephone	(613) 954-0032
Fax	(613) 954-3750
Web site	www.cbsa.gc.ca

Pierre Richard
Vice President
Admissibility Branch

---

Appendix A

Table 1: Impact of the Price of Ferrous Scrap in Europe on Rebar Prices on Apparent Canadian Rebar Prices

Period	Unit Price of rebar in the apparent Canadian Market per metric tonne CDN$	Unit price of shredded ferrous scrap FOB Rotterdam per metric tonne US$	Yearly Exchange Rate US$ to CDN$	Unit price of shredded ferrous scrap FOB Rotterdam per metric tonne CDN$	Estimated average base price in the apparent Canadian Market (unit ferrous scrap cost removed) per metric tonne CDN$
Year 2001	$381.82	$83.86	$1.55	$129.85	$251.97
Year 2002	$402.70	$105.41	$1.57	$165.53	$237.17
Year 2003	$447.39	$146.94	$1.40	$205.93	$241.46
1st quarter 2004	$524.50	$236.92	$1.32	$312.24	$212.26

Source: Exhibit 19 Metal Bulletin ferrous scrap price archives
Exhibit 89 Apparent Canadian market statistics

Table 2: Impact of the Price of Ferrous Scrap in the United States on Apparent Canadian Rebar Prices

Period	Unit Price of rebar in the apparent Canadian Market per metric tonne CDN$	Unit price of shredded ferrous scrap FOB U.S. East Coast per metric tonne US$	Yearly Exchange Rate US$ to CDN$	Unit price of shredded ferrous scrap FOB U.S. East Coast per metric tonne CDN$	Estimated average base price in the apparent Canadian Market (unit ferrous scrap cost removed) per metric tonne CDN$
Year 2001	$381.82	$84.37	$1.55	$130.64	$251.18
Year 2002	$402.70	$107.76	$1.57	$169.22	$233.48
Year 2003	$447.39	$140.51	$1.40	$196.92	$250.47
1st quarter 2004	$524.50	$193.08	$1.32	$254.46	$270.04

Source: Exhibit 19 Metal Bulletin ferrous scrap price archives
Exhibit 89 Apparent Canadian market statistics

Based on the analysis above, when the yearly average unit price of ferrous scrap is eliminated from the yearly average unit selling price of rebar in the Canadian market, it is clear that the increase in rebar prices is being caused by the dramatic increase in scrap costs, the main raw material in rebar production.

1 Concrete reinforcing bar is commonly referred to as "rebar" in the construction industry.

2 Exhibit 1. CCRA - Statement of Reasons regarding the Final Determination of dumping on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, December 13, 1999.

3 Exhibit 4. CCRA - Statement of Reasons regarding the Final Determination of dumping on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Chinese Taipei and Ukraine, May 2, 2001.

4 Exhibit 5. Canadian International Trade Tribunal (Tribunal) - Statement of Reasons regarding the Injury finding on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Chinese Taipei and Ukraine, June 1, 2001.

5 Exhibit 6. Customs Notice N-556, February 25, 2004.

6 Exhibit 8. Customs Tariff - Schedule.

7 Exhibit 55. Tab 1, Corporate Structure, Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation owns 100% of Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Special Sections Inc.

8 Exhibit 57. AltaSteel no longer produces rebar, response to ERQ - Question A20.

9 Exhibit 55. Gerdau response to ERQ - Question A2.

10 Exhibit 55. Gerdau response to ERQ - Question A2. On September 26, 2003, Gerdau amalgamated with a number of entities, including Gerdau Ameristeel Cambridge Inc. (formerly Gerdau Courtice Steel Inc.) to form Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation.

11 Exhibit 57. Stelco response to ERQ - Question A2.

12 Exhibit 57. Stelco (AltaSteel) response to ERQ - Question A2.

13 Exhibit 57. AltaSteel no longer produces rebar, response to ERQ - Question A20.

14 Exhibit 28. Yahoo Finance, Change of name for Stelco McMaster Ltée.

15 Exhibit 57. Stelco (Norambar) response to ERQ - Question A2.

16 Exhibit 57. Stelco response to ERQ, A11 Attachment, Stelco Inc. Financial Statements, First Quarter 2004 Report to the Shareholders (pages 1-2).

17 Exhibit 79. Yahoo Finance, Stelco obtains extension of stay period.

18 Exhibit 59. Sidbec response to ERQ - Question A2.

19 Tonne refers to a metric tonne which is equal to 1,000 kilograms, or 2,204.6 pounds or 1.102 short tons.

20 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market Statistics for the POR.

21 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market Statistics for the POR.

22 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market Statistics for the POR.

23 Exhibit 18. Enforcement information regarding certain concrete reinforcing bar for the POR.

24 Metal Bulletin PLC, All Metals & Forge, LLC, MEPS International Ltd., International Iron and Steel Institute, etc.

25 The response was designated as protected. As the response was received after the close of the record and the President was not taking it into consideration, no non-confidential version was requested from counsel.

26 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 4); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 21).

27 Long products, a classification of steel products that includes bar, rod, reinforcing bar and structural products, that are "long", rather than "flat".

28 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 5).

29 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 5); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (pages 12-13).

30 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 6).

31 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 7); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 21).

32 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 7-9).

33 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 12).

34 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 8-9).

35 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 12).

36 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 22-23).

37 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 10-12).

38 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 10).

39 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 12-13).

40 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 13).

41 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 13-14); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 7).

42 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 14).

43 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 7).

44 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 4-16).

45 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 15-18); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 17).

46 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 20).

47 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (pages 9-10).

48 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 8).

49 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 22-25); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (pages 17-20); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 25-31).

50 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 21).

51 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 26).

52 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 26); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 23-24).

53 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 27-28).

54 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 11).

55 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 3-4); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (pages 5-6).

56 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 19-20).

57 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 15-16).

58 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 19-20); Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 19).

59 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (pages 11-12).

60 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 13-14).

61 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 15-17); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 15); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 17-19).

62 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 18-19); Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 15); Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 18).

63 Exhibit 91. Sidbec case arguments (page 15).

64 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (page 19).

65 Exhibit 101. Stelco reply submission (pages 14-16).

66 Exhibit 93. Stelco case arguments (pages 27-29); Exhibit 101. Stelco reply submission (pages 8-10).

67 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (pages 4-13).

68 Exhibit 101. Stelco reply submission (pages 11-12).

69 Exhibit 101. Stelco reply submission (page 17).

70 The so-called principle of cumulation refers to a common practice of many of the signatories to the Anti-dumping Code whereby dumped imports from all subject countries are considered cumulatively for the purpose of establishing their impact on domestic production.

71 Exhibit 101. Stelco reply submission (page 5).

72 Although Ekinciler did not provide a case argument or a reply submission, they did provide a response to the exporter ERQ, listed as Exhibit 71.

73 Diler only provided a partial response to the ERQ.

74 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 3).

75 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 6).

76 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 6).

77 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 7).

78 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 7).

79 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 8).

80 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 8).

81 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 8).

82 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 9).

83 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 10).

84 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 11).

85 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 12).

86 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 13).

87 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 15).

88 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 12).

89 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 14).

90 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 15).

91 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 12).

92 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 14).

93 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 16).

94 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 16).

95 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 17).

96 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 17).

97 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 17).

98 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 18).

99 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 18).

100 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 19).

101 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 19).

102 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 19).

103 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 21).

104 Exhibit 95. Joint Turkish case arguments (page 22).

105 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 2).

106 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 3).

107 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 4).

108 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 5).

109 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 6).

110 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 7).

111 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 8).

112 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 9).

113 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 9).

114 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 9).

115 Exhibit 102. Joint Turkish reply submission (page 10).

116 Exhibit 26. All Metals & Forge LLC, Metals Watch, February 2004, which states that scrap accounts for 65% of the cost of production for mini-mills (page 12).

117 Exhibit 2. Tribunal - Statement of Reasons regarding the Injury finding on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, January 12, 2000.

118 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, price archive for ferrous scrap for the POR (pages 112-127).

119 Exhibit 40. United States Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel Scrap, January 2004 (page 1).

120 In the global commodity market, scrap is priced in United States dollars, therefore, as the United States dollar depreciates against foreign currency, the cost of scrap in that foreign currency becomes less expensive.

121 BOF operations are typically found in integrated mills.

122 EAF operations are typically found in mini-mill operations.

123 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, December 8, 2003, "Ferrous' run not over as BOFs facing shortages" (page 13); Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, January 12, 2004, "Scrap price hikes outpacing factory bundles" (page 25); Exhibit 30. Gerdau Ameristeel website, Industry News, February 25, 2004, "Steel prices threat to highway program..." (page 6); Exhibit 41. CNN Money, December 4, 2003, "Steel yourself for inflation" (page 1).

124 Exhibit 47. Recycling Today, 2004 Scrap Metals Supplement, January 2004 (page 2).

125 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, April 30, 2004, "Auto bundle prices slip as correction continues" (page 97).

126 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, June 4, 2004, "Export control effort wanes; focus turns to others' limits" (page 18); Exhibit 48. National Precast Concrete Association, March 5, 2004, "Rising rebar prices cause ripples" (page 1); Exhibit 47. Recycling Today, 2004 Scrap Metals Supplement, January 2004 (page 1); Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, March 3, 2004, "Korea moves to limit scrap, rebar exports" (page 58).

127 Exhibit 47. Recycling Today, 2004 Scrap Metals Supplement, January 2004 (page 3).

128 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, May 27, 2004, "Scrap exporters push China to extend licence deadline" (page 4).

129 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, May 25, 2004, "Global scrap prices drop further" (page 6).

130 Exhibit 26. MetalsWatch, February 2004 (page 12).

131 Exhibit 33. Bureau of International Recycling, Ferrous market assessment for the United States, February 18, 2004 (page 1).

132 Exhibit 57. Stelco response to ERQ, Attachments to Part A ERQ Response, North American Steel Industry Study, Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited, March 2004, Table 7 - Global Production by Region (page 8).

133 Exhibit 36. Worldsteel Org. International Iron and Steel Institute, Short range Outlook, April 30, 2004 (page 17).

134 Exhibit 86. Supplementary Information from V. Bazan on behalf of Turkish exporters, China Imports by Source, February 2004 (page 4).

135 Exhibit 55. Gerdau ERQ response, Tab 8 - weekly steel scrap price composite (page 172).

136 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, March 31, 2004, "Ferrous scrap prices fall as Turks remain out of the market" (page 72); Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, April 8, 2004, "Scrap prices decline; dealers go with the flow" (page 87); Exhibit 19.  Metal Bulletin, April 19, 2004, "Hush falls over ferrous scrap exports from the United States" (page 89); Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, April 22, 2004, "Ferrous prices from Black Sea suppliers slide" (page 93).

137 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, May 25, 2004, "Ferrous scrap prices to rebound in second half" (page 7).

138 Exhibit 27. The Globe and Mail, May 14, 2004, "China's molten hot industry a mixed blessing for Canada" (page 2).

139 Exhibit 25. People's Daily On-Line, March 10, 2004, "Sharp steel price increase expected to continue" (page 6).

140 Exhibit 38. China Daily, May 11, 2004, "China's steel sector still red hot" (page 3).

141 Exhibit 38. China Daily, May 11, 2004, "China's steel sector still red hot" (page 4).

142 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin Monthly, April 2004, "Recycled Argument" (page 80).

143 Exhibit 50. Recycling International, Market Analysis Ferrous, April 1, 2003, "Loss of Momentum for ferrous scrap prices" (page 2).

144 Exhibit 38. China Daily, May 11, 2004, "Steel prices drops 17% as slowdown bid pays off" (Page 1); Exhibit 38. China Daily, May 11, 2004, "China's steel sector still red hot" (page 3).

145 Exhibit 24. BBC News, May 12, 2004, "Is China's economic miracle in meltdown?" (page 3); Exhibit 81. Metals Watch, "Cover Story: the Economy and China" (page 4).

146 Exhibit 27. The Globe and Mail, May 14, 2004, "China's molten-hot industry a mixed blessing for Canada" (page 1); Exhibit 35. International Steel Market Roundup - May 2004 (page 18); Exhibit 38. China Daily, May 11, 2004, "China's steel sector still red hot" (page 3); Exhibit 76. The Standard, June 11, 2004, "Credit crunch to get worse" (page 4)

147 Exhibit 35. International Steel Market Roundup - May 2004 (page 18).

148 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, May 18, 2004, "Chinese impact on steel will expand: Ross" (page 1); Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, May 18, 2004, "China demand to stay strong despite price slide" (page 3).

149 Exhibit 35. MEPS International, January 2004, "Chinese long products output could destabilize Asian market" (page 1-2).

150 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, April 2004, Emerging Steel Products Monthly, Long Products (pages 82-83).

151 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, April 2004, Emerging Steel Products Monthly, Long Products (pages 82-83).

152 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, June 3, 2004, "Chinese re-exports hit Latin American prices" (page 17); Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, June 4, 2004, "EU traders receive big offers of Chinese steel" (page 21); Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, June 7, 2004, "Export orders up for Taiwanese rebar maker" (page 27).

153 Exhibit 74. Metal Bulletin, June 11, 2004, "Rebar prices fall as knock-on effects of Chinese slump hits" (page 31).

154 Exhibit 82. International Trade Canada, Export and Import Permits Bureau, Canadian Steel Import permits for the period January 1, 2004 to June 12, 2004.

155 Demand for concrete reinforcing bar is dependent on construction activity. Some major construction uses are office and apartment towers and bridges.

156 Exhibit 68. Special Report Canadian Construction Outlook, Scotia Economics, Scotiabank Group (page 29).

157 Exhibit 2. Tribunal - Statement of Reasons regarding the Injury finding on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, January 12, 2000.

158 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 4).

159 Exhibit 80. CBSA Enforcement information for the POR.

160 Exhibit 6. The re-investigation was initiated on October 1, 2003 and was concluded on January 29, 2004. The period of review was April 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003.

161 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, Price Archives for ferrous steel scrap for the POR (pages 112 - 127).

162 Exhibit 16. Tribunal Administrative Record, concerning expiry No. RR-2004-001, Submission of Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation and Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Specialty Sections Inc.

163 Exhibit 36. International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003. Table 20, Production of Concrete Reinforcing Bars.

164 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market. In 2003, the apparent market was 745,920 tonnes.

165 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market. In 2003, the imports from the Named Countries and other sources was 299,237 tonnes.

166 Exhibit 83. Acinox response to the ERQ (page 10).

167 Goods or services of Cuban origin may not be imported into the United States either directly or through third countries. The Cuban Assets Control regulations, 31 CFR Part 515, United States Government.

168 Exhibit 83. Acinox response to the ERQ (page 10).

169 Exhibit 2. Tribunal - Statement of Reasons regarding the Injury finding on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, January 12, 2000.

170 CCRA - Statement of Reasons regarding the Preliminary Determination of dumping on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, September 14, 1999.

171 Exhibit 83. Acinox response to the ERQ, Acinox states that they hope to increase the volume of exports (page 10).

172 Exhibit 80. CBSA enforcement information for the POR.

173 Exhibit 16. Tribunal Administrative Record, concerning expiry No. RR-2004-001, Submission of Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation and Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Specialty Sections Inc.

174 Exhibit 36. International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003. Table 20, Production of Concrete Reinforcing Bars (page 6)

175 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, March 3, 2004, "Korea moves to limit scrap, rebar exports" (page 58).

176 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, February 3, 2004, "Korean price hikes anger contractors, Hanbo's bar mill in Seoul reported that they were operating at full capacity" (page 52).

177 Exhibit 20. Tribunal Pre-hearing Staff Report, Safeguard Inquiry on Certain Steel Products Reinforcing Bar, May 16, 2002 (page 33).

178 Exhibit 35. MEPS International Steel Market Roundup, March 2004, Long Products. It is reported that Korean building investment in 2004 will not match the peak that was reached in 2003 (page 9).

179 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market. In 2003, the apparent market was 745,920 tonnes.

180 Exhibit 89. Apparent Canadian Market. In 2003, the imports from the Named Countries and other sources was 299,237 tonnes.

181 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 28).

182 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 29).

183 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 29).

184 Exhibit 93. Gerdau case arguments (page 31).

185 MEPS International is a steel trade magazine.

186 Exhibit 35. MEPS International Steel Roundup, February 2004 (page 4).

187 Exhibit 19. Metal Bulletin, February 3, 2004, "Korean price hikes anger contractors" (page 42).

188 CCRA - Statement of Reasons regarding the Preliminary Determination of dumping on certain concrete reinforcing bar originating in or exported from the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey, September 14, 1999.

189 Exhibit 6. Customs Notice N-556, February 25, 2004.

190 Exhibit 71. Ekinciler noted that "due to the big economic crisis in Turkey and resulting financial problems, EKDEMIR has temporarily stopped iron - steel production and trade in August 2000. EKDEMIR has restarted production in February 2004."

191 Exhibit 71. Ekinciler Demir ve Celik San. A.S., Response to the Expiry Review ERQ - Exporter.

192 Exhibit 80. CBSA enforcement information regarding the subject goods for the POR.

193 Exhibit 16. Tribunal Administrative Record, concerning expiry No. RR-2004-001, Submission of Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation and Gerdau Ameristeel MRM Specialty Sections Inc.

194 Exhibit 36. Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003, International Iron and Steel Institute.

195 Exhibit 71. Ekinciler Demir ve Celik San. A.S., Response to the Expiry Review ERQ - Exporter (page 22).

196 Between 1995 and 1999, the utilization rate for Turkish producers of long products has averaged between 62% and 70%. Exhibit 37. page 7, United States Foreign Policy and Trade Protection, The Importance of the Turkish Steel Access to the U.S. Market, January 8, 2002.

197 Exhibit 20. Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Pre-Hearing staff Report, Inquiry No. GC-2001-001, Safeguard Inquiry on Steel Products Reinforcing Bar, May 16, 2002.

198 Exhibit 37. United States Foreign Policy and Trade Protection, The Importance of the Turkish Steel Access to the U.S. Market, January 8, 2002 (page 6).

199 Exhibit 37. United States Foreign Policy and Trade Protection, The Importance of the Turkish Steel Access to the U.S. Market, January 8, 2002 (page 6).

200 United States imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on concrete reinforcing bars from Turkey on April 17, 1997, and the case was renewed on March 26, 2003.

201 The anti-dumping investigation covered all subject goods released into Canada during the period of investigation, October 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999.

202 Egypt imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on concrete reinforcing bars from Turkey on October 23, 1999.

203 Exhibit 51. European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries, January 2004. The report notes that "light long products from Turkey were extremely disruptive in 2003 and continuation of this in 2004 will lead to trade action".

204 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 28).

205 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 29).

206 Exhibit 92. Gerdau case arguments (page 31).

207 Exhibit 22. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Certain Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Turkey, A-489-807, July 9, 2002. It was determined that the revocation of the anti-dumping order would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at weighted average margins between 9.84% and 41.80%.

208 Exhibit 23. United States International Trade Commission, Investigation No. 731-TA-745 (Review) Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar from Turkey (February 2003).