ARCHIVED - STATEMENT OF REASONS

This page has been archived.

OTTAWA, June 30, 2005
RR-2004-007

Concerning a determination under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the Special Import Measures Act respecting

THE DUMPING OF REFINED SUGAR ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND
THE SUBSIDIZING OF REFINED SUGAR ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

On June 17, 2005, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the Special Import Measures Act, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency determined that the expiry of the orders made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal on November 3, 2000, in Review No. RR-99-006, in respect of refined sugar originating in or exported from the United States of America, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the European Union, was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping into Canada of the goods from United States of America, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of subsidizing of the goods from the European Union.

This statement of reasons is also available in French. Cet énoncé des motifs est également disponible en français.

---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• SUMMARY
• BACKGROUND
• PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
• CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTS
• PERIOD OF REVIEW
• CANADIAN INDUSTRY
• CANADIAN MARKET
• CASE ENFORCEMENT
• ENFORCEMENT DATA
• PARTICIPANTS
• INFORMATION USED BY THE PRESIDENT
• POSITION OF THE PARTIES
• CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS
• CONCLUSION
• FUTURE ACTION
• INFORMATION
• APPENDIX

---

SUMMARY

[1] On February 17, 2005, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (Tribunal), pursuant to subsection 76.03(3) of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), initiated an expiry review of its orders made on November 3, 2000, in Review No. RR-99-006 (the orders), continuing, with amendment, its findings made on November 6, 1995, in Enquiry No. NQ-95-002, concerning the dumping of refined sugar, refined from sugar cane or sugar beets, in granulated, liquid and powdered form, originating in or exported from the United States of America (United States), Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the subsidizing of refined sugar, refined from sugar cane or sugar beets, in granulated, liquid and powdered form, originating in or exported from the European Union. The orders are scheduled to expire on November 2, 2005.

[2] The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) initiated an expiry review investigation on February 18, 2005, to determine whether the expiry of the orders is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping and/or subsidizing of the subject goods.

[3] On June 17, 2005, the President of the CBSA (President), determined, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA, that the expiry of the orders was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping into Canada of the goods from the United States, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and was likely to result in the continuation or resumption of subsidizing of the goods from the European Union.

BACKGROUND

[4] On March 17, 1995, in response to a complaint filed by the Canadian Sugar Institute (CSI), the Deputy Minister of National Revenue (now the President of the CBSA) initiated an investigation respecting the alleged injurious dumping of refined sugar, originating in or exported from the United States, Denmark, the Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea, and the alleged subsidizing of refined sugar, originating in or exported from the United States and the European Union.

[5] A preliminary determination of dumping was made on July 7, 1995, with respect to the subject goods from all the named countries and a preliminary determination of subsidizing was made on the same date with respect to subject goods from the
European Union. At the same time, the subsidy investigation with respect to refined sugar from the United States was terminated.

[6] On October 5, 1995, a final determination of dumping and a final determination of subsidizing were made with respect to the subject goods. On November 6, 1995, the Tribunal issued findings of future injury with respect to the dumping and/or subsidizing of the subject goods. In making it’s finding of dumping, the Tribunal excluded the Republic of Korea. The Tribunal also excluded a number of specialty sugar products from these findings.

[7] On November 3, 2000, the Tribunal issued orders reaffirming the findings with an amendment to exclude further products.

[8] On December 23, 2004, the Tribunal issued a notice of expiry of the November 3, 2000 orders. Based on the available information and the information submitted by the interested parties, the Tribunal decided that an expiry review of the
orders was warranted and on February 17, 2005, the Tribunal initiated an expiry review (RR-2004-006).

[9] On February 18, 2005, the CBSA initiated its expiry review investigation to determine whether the expiry of the orders is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping and/or subsidizing of the subject goods.

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

[10] For purposes of this expiry review, the subject goods are defined as refined sugar, refined from sugar cane or sugar beets, in granulated, liquid and powdered form.

[11] Refined sugar is sold as white granulated, liquid and specialty sugars. Granulated sugar comes in a range of grain fractions (e.g., medium, fine and extra fine). Liquid sugar includes invert sugar. Specialty sugars include soft yellow sugar, brown sugar, icing sugar, demerara sugar and others and may be sold in granulated, liquid or powdered form. Refined sugar is sold in a broad range of shipping and packaging configurations. These include 2-, 4-, 10-, 20- and 40-kg bags, and in bulk by rail-car, truckload or one metric tonne intermediate bulk containers. Liquid sugar is sold by rail-car, truckload, drum and pail.

[12] At the time of the original findings, the Tribunal excluded certain name-brand specialty sugar products. In 1997, the Governor-in-Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, issued Remission Order P.C.1997-1523 for anti-dumping and countervailing duties on more generic specialty products that were not identified by specific brand names. Another Remission Order (P.C. 1998-1889) came into effect on October 22, 1998, excluding charitable food donations by a non-resident of Canada to a registered charity. In 2000, the Tribunal continued the 1995 findings, with an amendment to exclude further specialty sugar products, including products covered by the 1997 remission order. A full list of product exclusions is included in the Appendix.

CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORTS

[13] The subject goods are normally imported into Canada under the following Harmonized System (HS) classification numbers:¹

Number	Description
1701.91.00.11	Brown sugar put up for retail sale
1701.91.00.19	Other
1701.91.00.21	Powders for the preparation of lemonade and the like put up for retail sale
1701.91.00.29	Other
1701.91.00.91	Other put up for retail sale
1701.91.00.99	Other
1701.99.00.10	Icing sugar
1701.99.00.21	Granulated, not cubed, put up for retail sale
1701.99.00.29	Other
1701.99.00.90	Other
1702.90.00.00	Invert sugar and other sugar syrups containing after inversion, reducing sugars weighing 75% or more of the total solid weight and in receptacles where the gross weight exceeds 27 kg
1702.90.11.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion not exceeding 65% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.12.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 65% but not exceeding 70% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.13.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 70% but not exceeding 71% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.14.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 71% but not exceeding 72% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.15.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 72% but not exceeding 73% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.16.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 73% but not exceeding 74% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.17.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 74% but not exceeding 75% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.18.00	containing reducing sugars after inversion exceeding 75% by weight of the total syrup
1702.90.30.10	Other invert sugars and other sugar syrups - cane or beet
1702.90.60.00	Other sucrose sugars

PERIOD OF REVIEW

[14] The CBSA’s period of review (POR) is January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004.

CANADIAN INDUSTRY

[15] The CSI is a trade association comprised of all Canadian producers of the
subject goods. Its address is: WaterPark Place, Suite 620, 10 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario M5J 2R8.

[16] The Canadian industry is currently comprised of three Canadian producers of refined sugar: Rogers Sugar Limited (Rogers), Tate & Lyle Canada Ltd. (TLC) and Lantic Sugar Limited (Lantic).

[17] Since the 1995 injury finding by the Tribunal, there have been changes in the ownership and production facilities of all three producers, most of which occurred prior to the last Tribunal review of the injury finding in 2000.

[18] Currently, both Lantic and Rogers operate as subsidiaries of the Rogers Sugar Income Fund, which acquired Lantic in March 2002. Lantic operates a cane refinery in Montreal, Quebec, and Rogers has a beet sugar plant in Taber, Alberta, and a cane refinery in Vancouver, British Columbia.

[19] On January 1, 2005, Redpath Sugars, formerly a division of Tate & Lyle North American Sugars Limited, became Tate & Lyle Canada Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tate & Lyle PLC. In addition to its cane refinery in Toronto, TLC operates a facility in Niagara Falls, Ontario that specializes in custom blending and packaging of sugar containing products for markets in the United States, Canada and Mexico.

CANADIAN MARKET

[20] The following table contains data concerning the apparent Canadian market of refined sugar during the POR. The volume of the Canadian market for refined sugar was calculated from Statistics Canada import data² and information provided by the CSI.³

TABLE 1 Total Canadian Market – Metric tonnes (MT)
	2002	2003	2004
Imports:	MT	MT	MT
Total Imports – all countries *	41,983	31,656	35,180
Total Domestic Shipments	1,207,760	1,277,954	1,307,785
Apparent Total Canadian Market	1,249,743	1,309,610	1,342,965

* Cane and beet sugar only under HS headings 1701.91, 1701.99 and 1702.90

CASE ENFORCEMENT

Dumping – United States of America

[21] The United States domestic market for sugar is regulated in a manner that results in high prices for sugar cane, sugar beets, raw cane sugar, refined sugar and sugar-containing products. Accordingly, the normal values reflected these high supported prices and resulted in a weighted average margin of dumping of 78% at the time of the final determination.

[22] Four exporters in the United States were provided with specific normal values in the original investigation. The normal values were established pursuant to section 15 of SIMA, based on profitable sales in the domestic market, or section 19 of SIMA, based on the cost of production, plus an amount for administrative, selling and all other costs, plus an amount for profits. Normal values for all other exporters are established on the basis of export price plus the 78% weighted average margin of dumping found for cooperative exporters.

[23] Subsequent to the Tribunal findings, some exporters requested normal values and were provided with Requests for Information to complete, however, from the time of the finding in 1995 to the time of the Tribunal review in 2000, only four exporters submitted sufficient information to obtain specific normal values. Since the Tribunal review in 2000, no United States exporter has requested specific normal values.

Dumping – Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

[24] The normal values for exports from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are determined by ministerial specification. Normal values for uncooperative exporters are based on the highest margin of dumping (180%) found for exporters in the United States that provided complete information. For all other exporters, normal values are based on the weighted average margin of dumping (78%) found for cooperative exporters in the United States.

[25] From the time of the original investigation, the European Union has provided extensive support to the sugar industries, resulting in sugar prices well above world levels. Accordingly, a reinvestigation of normal values has not been conducted, as any specific normal values would be based on high support prices. Since the finding in 1995, only one exporter from the Netherlands has requested a specific normal value for one product. No other European exporter has expressed any interest in obtaining specific normal values.

Subsidy – European Union

[26] Sugar producers in the European Union are supported by a sugar regime that is administered as part of the Common Agricultural Policy by the Commission of the European Communities (E.C.). This regime guarantees sugar producers in the member countries a price for sugar that is higher than the world price.

[27] On November 30, 2004, the CBSA concluded a reinvestigation of the amounts of subsidy on refined sugar from the European Union. The reinvestigation confirmed that the subsidy programs are still in existence and have not been significantly modified since the original investigation in 1995.

[28] At the time of the original investigation, the E.C. made a complete submission regarding subsidy programs, however, none of the exporters of the subject goods responded. Accordingly, the amount of subsidy for each European Union country was determined by ministerial specification.

[29] As a result of the reinvestigation, a countervailing duty currently equal to
51.375 EUR/100 kg is currently applied to all imports of subject goods originating in or exported from the European Union. This amount represents the sum of the amounts conferred through the export refunds program, and adjustment aid and additional basic aid program, as fixed by the E.C. and published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

ENFORCEMENT DATA

[30] Imports of the subject goods from the United States and the European Union for domestic consumption in Canada have virtually ceased since the injury finding in November 1995. While import statistics show that imports from these countries accounted for almost 20% of all imports, manufacturers of sugar-containing products account for over 80% of subject sugar imported from the United States. This sugar is imported under the duty deferral program and subsequently re-exported. The imports from the
European Union are mostly non-subject sugars or specialty sugars.

[31] The following table contains a summary of the enforcement data for refined sugar during the POR.⁴ The figures reveal that almost CAD$6.9 million of anti-dumping duties were collected on subject goods. Of this amount, approximately CAD$5.9 million was accounted for under the duty deferral program. Under the provisions of this program, any applicable anti-dumping duties are accounted for at the time of entry into Canada, but payment of these duties is deferred, pending re-export of the goods, usually in the form of sugar-containing products. The anti-dumping duties only become payable if the goods stay in Canada.

TABLE 2
Value for Duty of Imports (CAD$)

	2002		2003		2004
COUNTRY	Export Price	SIMA Paid	Export Price	SIMA Paid	Export Price	SIMA Paid
European Union *	118,097	42,377	107,645	42,818	159,014	59,597
United States **	3,392,481	2,722,633	3,695,523	2,164,230	2,322,929	1,867,272
OTHER countries ***	14,864,043		9,503,422	2,571	10,169,418	8,226
Total	18,374,621	2,765,010	13,306,590	2,209,619	12,651,361	1,935,096

* As of July 1, 2004, imports from new European Union member countries are treated as originating in the European Union

** United States value includes sugar imported under the duty deferral program and subsequently
re-exported after further processing.

*** SIMA duties are payable on goods originating in a non-subject country if exported from a subject country.

PARTICIPANTS

[32] On February 17, 2005, the Tribunal’s expiry review notice was sent to all known Canadian producers, importers, exporters and interested parties.

[33] Parties wishing to submit information were provided with an Expiry Review Questionnaire (ERQ). The ERQ requested the information needed to evaluate the factors, as listed in subsection 37.2(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR). Any person or government having an interest in this investigation was also invited to provide a submission regarding the likelihood of the continuation or resumption of dumping and or subsidizing of the goods should the orders be allowed to expire.

[34] The CSI and its members (Lantic, Rogers and TLC) provided responses to the producer ERQ. Case arguments and a reply submission were also received from the CSI claiming that the dumping and/or subsidizing would likely continue or resume should the orders be allowed to expire.

[35] Only one importer, Acton GT Marketing, provided a response to the importer ERQ. This company did not submit case arguments or a reply submission in response to case arguments submitted by other parties.

[36] Only one exporter, American Sugar Refining, Inc. (ASR), provided a response to the exporter ERQ and additional evidence. Case arguments and a reply submission were also received from ASR, claiming that dumping from the United States is not likely to continue or resume should the orders be allowed to expire.

INFORMATION USED BY THE PRESIDENT

Administrative Record

[37] The information to be used and considered by the President for purposes of this expiry review proceeding is contained on the administrative record. The administrative record includes the exhibits listed on the CBSA’s Exhibit Listing, which is comprised of the Tribunal’s administrative record at initiation of the expiry review, CBSA exhibits and information submitted by interested persons, including information which they believe is relevant to the decision as to whether dumping and/or subsidizing is likely to continue or resume. This information may consist of expert analysts’ reports, excerpts from trade magazines and newspapers, orders and findings issued by authorities of Canada or of a country other than Canada, responses to the ERQs and any other information contained on the Exhibit Listing.

[38] The CBSA sets a date after which no “new” information may be placed on the administrative record. This is referred to as the “closing of the record date”. For this expiry review, the administrative record closed on April 11, 2005. This allowed participants time to prepare their case arguments and reply submissions based on the information that was on the administrative record as of the closing of the record date.

[39] After the closing of the record, new information was added that was not available before the closing of the record. Since this information was relevant to the expiry review investigation, it was added to the record for consideration by the President. All participants were provided with the opportunity to respond to the new information.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

Parties Contending that Continued or Resumed Dumping and/or Subsidizing is Likely

Position of the Canadian Sugar Institute regarding the United States

[40] The CSI presented case arguments in support of its position that anti-dumping measures should remain in place. The CSI position is based on the following factors:

• United States government support programs;
• continued dumping and the amount of anti-dumping duty paid throughout the POR;
• extremely low prices on sales to Canada;
• uncertainty in the financial performance of the United States sugar industry due to
  fluctuations in the production of both beet and cane sugar;
• exports to Canada would increase if the order is allowed to expire;
• the production capacity in the United States;
• the inventory of refined sugar in the United States; and
• the world market for sugar.

[41] The CSI stated that the United States sugar program was the structural cause of the dumping in both 1995 and 2000, and the factors that were taken into consideration at the time of the last review continue to be valid today. The CSI argued that the United States government’s sugar program supports domestic sugar prices, restricts imports, generates surpluses and encourages exports.

[42] The CSI explained that dumped imports of United States refined sugar are presently entering Canada, primarily as a result of exclusions to, or exceptions from, the application or collection of the anti-dumping duties. However, the volume of these imports is small in comparison to the volume of imports prior to the imposition of the anti-dumping duties in 1995. Import statistics show that imports of refined sugar from the United States declined 90% between 1994 and 2004, with most of the decline occurring in 1995, when
anti-dumping duties were imposed.

[43] The CSI noted that all imports from the United States were dumped throughout the POR, indicating that continued or resumed dumping is likely in the absence of the orders. The CSI used CBSA enforcement statistics during the POR to support its position.

[44] The CSI cited unpredictable fluctuations in the production of both beet and cane sugar as a cause of uncertainty in the financial performance of the United States sugar industry both now and in the future, supporting an affirmative determination of the likelihood of resumed dumping. The CSI supported its position with evidence of fluctuations in refined sugar production throughout the period from 1995/96 through to 2003/04.⁵

[45] Furthermore, the CSI cautioned against interpreting decreases in plantings and harvest as evidence of decreased refined sugar production, noting that sugar beet production and yield vary as a consequence of weather. The CSI stated that cane sugar production was significantly disrupted during the 2004/05 crop year due to unprecedented weather conditions (hurricanes) and harvest conditions, not due to changes in the
United States sugar program, thus production could be expected to resume at normal levels in 2005/06.

[46] The CSI further noted that United States exports are not a straightforward function of production because the United States Re-export Program permits cane refiners to import lower-priced world raw sugar in order to increase their refinery throughput by stimulating exports.

[47] In the absence of anti-dumping duties, the CSI emphasized that Canada would be open to United States exports, being the only country in North and South America without government intervention and import restrictions on refined sugar. The CSI noted that Canada is a well-developed market for industrial applications of sugar, with many
United States multinational food processors operating in Canada. These processors are situated close to the United States market, enabling convenient supply arrangements with United States refiners and beet processors.

[48] The CSI provided evidence that United States refined cane sugar exports to all countries in 2003/04 were at their highest level since 1995/96 and beet sugar exports were at their highest level since 1994/95.⁶

[49] The CSI maintained that United States cane refiners have excess capacity and it is in their commercial interest to export to Canada. The CSI argued that, with the support programs in the United States, cane refiners would export to Canada even if they only receive a contribution to overhead and not earn profit.

[50] The CSI provided evidence that the United States has ending stocks (inventories) of refined sugar that are close in size to the entire Canadian market. Furthermore, the CSI noted that the recent decrease in ending stocks is due to weather conditions in the fiscal year, and not a structural change in production capability.

[51] Evidence provided by the CSI shows that world sugar stocks are still very high, a position supported by the United States domestic industry when it provided evidence of a record global sugar surplus as part of the current United States sunset review of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on refined sugar from the European Union.

Position of the Canadian Sugar Institute regarding the European Union

[52] The CSI presented case arguments in support of its position that anti-dumping and/or subsidizing measures should remain in place.

[53] The CSI position is based on the following factors, relevant to both dumping and subsidizing:

• The lack of significant changes to European Union subsidies since the final determination;
• Continued imports into Canada and payment of SIMA duty throughout the POR;
• Price levels of exported European Union sugar;
• European Union sugar surpluses and the European Union’s position a net exporter of refined sugar;
• Large sugar producers continue to operate in the four countries subject to dumping action;
• The evidence of measures taken by countries other than Canada against refined sugar from the European Union; and
• The likelihood of Canada as a target for European Union sugar in the absence of the orders.

[54] The CSI argued that the nature of the European Union subsidies, which are primarily granted to bridge the gap between the prevailing world market price and the domestic support price, supports its position on the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping and/or subsidizing of European Union refined sugar. The CSI noted that the CBSA concluded a reinvestigation of the amount of subsidy on November 30, 2004, at which time the amount of subsidy was determined to be 51.375 Euro per 100 kg.

[55] The CSI noted that import and enforcement statistics show that dumping and subsidizing continued throughout the entire period of review. While volumes were low, all imports were dumped and subsidized, due to the nature of the European Union sugar program, and accordingly attracted substantial SIMA duties ranging from 35% to 214% of the value for duty of subject imports.⁷ Should the Tribunal’s orders expire, the CSI claimed that bulk white granulated refined sugar from the European Union would be made available for sale in Canada at the depressed/residual world price.

[56] The CSI noted that large export-capable producers continue to operate in the four countries that are subject to the Tribunal’s dumping order. Imports from Denmark have ceased, which the CSI viewed as a strong indicator that dumping and subsidizing would continue in absence of the orders, since exporters have not been able to sell to Canada otherwise.

[57] The CSI provided evidence that the European Union has surplus sugar and is a net exporter of refined sugar. The CSI demonstrated that European Union sugar stocks for the four countries subject to dumping action are almost four times the size of the Canadian market and total European Union ending stocks are seven times the size of the Canadian market. It is further stated that the European Union dominates the world refined sugar trade with exports averaging 5 million tonnes annually since 2000.

[58] The CSI noted that the United States currently has anti-dumping measures in place against imports of refined sugar from Belgium, France and Germany. On March 30, 2005, a United States sunset review found that revoking the measures would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping. While the European Union countries named in the United States review, with the exception of Germany, differ from those named in the Canadian order, the CSI maintained that the same factors that led to the United States decision also apply to the Canadian order against refined sugar from Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

[59] The CSI also noted that the United States currently has countervailing duty measures in place against imports of subsidized sugar from the European Union. On March 21, 2005, the United States Department of Commerce preliminarily found that the revocation of the countervailing duty measures on refined sugar from the European Union would “be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy” at a net countervailable subsidy of 21.63 U.S. cents per pound.⁸ The CSI argued that the United States actions support an affirmative determination of the likelihood of continued or resumed subsidization in this review.

[60] The CSI argued that widespread government intervention and import restrictions in countries other than Canada diverted European Union refined sugar exports to Canada prior to the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties and, in the absence of the orders, Canada would once again be a target for dumped and subsidized exports of European Union sugar.

Parties Contending that Continued or Resumed Dumping and/or Subsidizing is

not Likely

Position of American Sugar Refining, Inc.

[61] ASR’s position that resumed or continued dumping of subject goods from the United States is not likely is based on the following factors:

• The volume of imports while the order has been in place;
• The fact that a limited number of Canadian manufacturers are using the duty deferral program to import United States sugar without anti-dumping duty;
• The global sugar supply and the sugar supply in the United States market;
• United States cane refining capacity and the capacity utilization levels; and
• The absence of incentives for United States exporters to export to Canada.

[62] According to ASR, the low volume of imports of refined sugar from the
United States to Canada during the POR indicates that resumed or continued dumping is not likely if the order is allowed to expire. ASR further argued that, as a matter of law, affirmative expiry review decisions cannot be based on relatively small volumes of dumped goods.

[63] ASR stated that multinational industrial producers of sugar containing products that export most of their production from Canada to the United States account for one quarter to one-third of total Canadian domestic consumption of refined sugar.⁹ Currently, under the provisions of Canada’s duty deferral program, refined sugar can be imported, used as an input in the manufacture of sugar containing products, and then exported from Canada, without the payment of anti-dumping duties. ASR noted that United States imports could theoretically supply a substantial share of this market, yet the volume of United States refined sugar imports was low during the POR. Accordingly, ASR argued that factors other than the existence of anti-dumping duties must be responsible for the low volume of imports from the United States.

[64] ASR stated that consolidation and plant closures in the United States cane refining industry over the past five years have had an impact on capacity utilization in the industry. To support this position, ASR provided estimates of United States cane refining industry’s capacity utilization and production for 2004. ASR claimed that the same trend has been seen in the beet processing industry, with the situation unlikely to change in the near future as 2005 sugar beet plantings are down 3% from the previous year.¹⁰

[65] ASR maintained that the United States market is in an undersupply situation, with ending sugar stocks for 2005/06 projected to be lower than any time during the past decade. Regarding the world market for sugar, ASR provided a 2004 USDA report forecasting worldwide ending stocks for 2004/05 to be at their lowest level in the past five years.¹¹

[66] ASR stated that United States producers have little or no economic incentive to export to Canada at reduced prices, given that prices are higher in the United States market than in Canada and the United States market is in an undersupply position.

Parties that do not Express an Opinion on the Likelihood of Continued or
Resumed Dumping and/or Subsidizing

[67] The CBSA received a response to an importer ERQ from Action GT Marketing, an importer of subject goods from France. This company did not express an opinion as to the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping and/or subsidizing.

[68] The CBSA received no other representations expressing an opinion on the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping and/or subsidizing.

CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS

[69] Subsection 76.03(7) of the SIMA requires the President to determine whether the expiry of the order or finding in respect of the goods of a country or countries is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping or subsidizing of the goods. When making this determination, the President may consider the factors set out in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR. Guided by the factors in the SIMR and based on the documentation submitted by the various participants and the consideration of the information on the administrative record, the following is a list of factors considered in this analysis:

• The United States and the European Union continue to support their sugar industries. As a result, domestic prices and/or levels of subsidy are high;
• The levels of the normal values and amounts of subsidy have resulted in a substantial decline in imports since SIMA duties were first imposed and is indicative of an inability to sell to Canada without dumping or subsidizing;
• Future performance of the exporters is likely to remain the same, in that exporters will not be able to sell to Canada without dumping and/or subsidizing;
• The United States has excess capacity, equal to a substantial portion of the Canadian market;
• The United States has inventories that are close in size to the entire Canadian market;
• The European Union is a net exporter of refined sugar and has inventories that are approximately seven times the size of the Canadian market;
• The United States currently has anti-dumping measures in place against certain European countries and countervailing duty measures in place against imports of subsidized sugar from the European Union; and
• Widespread government intervention and import restrictions by countries other than Canada make Canada a likely target for exports of refined sugar from the United States and the European Union, in the absence of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.

A discussion of these factors follows.

United States

[70] United States sugar prices continue to be supported through the United States sugar program under the authority of the 2002 Farm Bill (The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002), which amended previous legislation and covers the sugar marketing years 2002/03 through 2007/08. The legislation continues the essential elements of the previous sugar program that were factors in the original 1995 finding and the Tribunal’s review in 2000.

[71] As long as the key provisions of the United States sugar program continue,
United States domestic sugar prices, and consequently normal values, will remain significantly higher than world sugar prices. In 2004, the supported domestic prices of
18 cents per pound for refined cane sugar and 22.9 cents per pound for refined beet sugar¹² compared with a world refined sugar price of 10.25 cents per pound for refined sugar.¹³ As such, United States exporters cannot sell to Canada without dumping, as Canadian prices are substantially lower than the supported prices in the United States.

[72] A major element of the United States sugar program is the Refined Sugar Re-export Program. Through the provisions of this program, refiners with excess capacity can import world priced raw sugar, increase throughput in the refineries and stimulate exports of both cane and beet sugar. The re-export program was a major consideration by the Tribunal at the time of the finding in 1995 and again during the expiry review in 2000. At the time of its 2000 review, the Tribunal stated:

“Use of the U.S. Sugar Re-export Program enables licensed cane sugar refiners to increase their throughput and reduce their unit costs in order to remain competitive. The domestic industry submitted that U.S. refiners would sell re-export sugar to Canada at prices that were based upon refining margins only slightly above variable costs of processing as a means of achieving the required capacity utilization. The Tribunal notes that, with export prices based on world-priced sugar and U.S. refining costs based upon a commingling of world- and U.S.-priced raw cane sugar, dumping by the U.S. refiners is a certainty.”¹⁴

[73] Five years later, the program not only still exists, but it has been expanded and made more flexible. The legislation now specifies that all refined sugars derived from sugar cane or sugar beets are substitutable under the program, which is more conducive for exports to Canada, as beet processing facilities are close to the Canadian border. The continuation and expansion of the United States re-export program has the potential to stimulate exports to Canada if the orders are rescinded.

[74] Imports into Canada have declined substantially since anti-dumping duties were first imposed and a minimal quantity of subject goods was imported during the POR. This decline in imports is a direct consequence of the high normal values for refined sugar that result from the price support system in the United States. A small volume of imports can have a substantial adverse impact on a commodity product, such as refined sugar, that competes primarily on price. Furthermore, the small volume of imports since the
anti-dumping duties were imposed is an indicator that refined sugar cannot be sold to Canada at undumped prices.

[75] The provisions of the United States sugar program ensure that domestic prices will remain higher than world prices in the near to medium term. It should be noted that imports during the POR were dumped, with anti-dumping duties ranging from 54% to 94% of the value for duty of the goods.¹⁵ As the re-export program facilitates exports based on world prices, which are significantly lower than the United States domestic supported prices, it is reasonable to conclude that export sales of refined sugar would have to be dumped in order to sell into the Canadian market.

[76] In view of this conclusion, the CBSA’s analysis centred on the likely performance of United States exporters in the near and medium future if the orders were to be rescinded. Factors affecting future performance include the pricing of refined sugar into Canada, fluctuations in sugar production, capacity utilization rates of United States sugar refiners, inventories (ending stocks) of refined sugar and export opportunities for United States sugar producers.

[77] Import prices were examined by looking at bulk granulated sugar that entered Canada under HS code 1701.99.00.29. The CBSA notes that this code covers bulk granulated sugar and thus should only contain subject goods. The average value for duty based on Statistics Canada import data for calendar year 2004 was compared with the average price of wholesale refined beet sugar in the United States domestic market for the same period. The United States wholesale prices were adjusted downward to remove delivery costs, using the range of delivery cost estimates provided by both the CSI and ASR. The resulting margins of dumping range from 68% to 92%, when compared with the average value for duty of bulk granulated sugar imported into Canada.

[78] The above analysis of the price of bulk granulated sugar from the United States confirms that it was exported to Canada at dumped prices. In 2004, total imports under this HS code represented approximately 94% of all subject sugar imported into Canada. Furthermore, most of the sugar imported under this HS code was imported free of
anti-dumping duties under the duty deferral program, whereby goods are imported for further processing in Canada and subsequently re-exported to the United States. Accordingly, the CBSA believes that the prices to Canada on the duty deferral imports provide a good indication of price levels that would be available to the Canadian market as a whole if the orders were rescinded and anti-dumping duties were not applicable.

[79] Both parties in this review provided information on historical production and projections for future production of United States refined cane and beet sugar. While production has varied over the years, USDA figures submitted by the CSI¹⁶ show that the production for the nine years from 1995/96 through to 2003/04 averaged 8.2 million STRV.¹⁷ World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), filed as new evidence by ASR after the closing of the record, showed that projected production for 2005/06 (see below) is in line with historical average production levels, with declines in beet sugar production offset by increases in cane sugar production.¹⁸

TABLE 3
United States Refined Sugar Supply for POR (with projections to 2005/06) 1,000 STRV

Crop Year (Oct. 1 to Sept. 30)	Beginning Stocks	Production	Imports	Total Supply	Total Use	Ending Stocks
2002/03	1,528	8,426	1,730	11,684	10,014	1,670
2003/04	1,670	8,649	1,746	12,065	10,168	1,897
2004/05*	1,897	8,053	1,639	11,589	10,180	1,409
2005/06**	1,343	8,140	1,591	11,074	10,315	759

* Projection as of April 2005

** Projection as of May 2005

[80] The more important issue is the effect of production and use on the size of ending stocks (inventories) of United States refined sugar. Projected ending stocks for 2004/05 are close in size to the entire Canadian refined sugar market and are also similar in size to 1995/96, immediately after the Tribunal finding, when stocks were 1.49 million STRV.¹⁹

[81] ASR cited the projected ending stocks for 2005/06 as evidence of a shortage of supply in the United States market in the near and medium term, however, the WASDE report contains cautions that the production estimates were made before beet planting commenced and the estimate of imports only reflects the United States commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to import a minimum quantity of raw and refined sugar, as actual levels have yet to be established. Furthermore, the potentially decreased sugar stocks still constitute almost half of the entire Canadian market²⁰. In addition, at no time in the past 10 years, nor in future projections, has the consumption of refined sugar in the United States market exceeded the supply, according to data on the administrative record.²¹

[82] In determining the likelihood of resumed dumping to Canada if the orders were removed, the CBSA examined the production capacity of the United States industry. The CSI and ASR both provided estimates of United States capacity utilization. Based on these estimates, the CBSA concluded that there is enough excess capacity in the United States market to permit significant increased exports to Canada if the orders were rescinded.

[83] Another significant factor affecting future exports to Canada is that Canada would be one of the few open markets for refined sugar if anti-dumping measures did not exist, making it attractive for exporters. Widespread government intervention and import restrictions by other countries would make an unprotected Canadian market a likely target for exports of refined sugar from the United States. Evidence has been provided summarizing trade barriers placed on sugar by other countries that would make Canada the closest open market to the United States in the absence of the Tribunal’s orders.²²

European Union

[84] The European Union continues to produce surplus sugar and is a net exporter. The European Union is the world’s largest exporter of refined sugar, with exports that have historically averaged around 5 million MT per year.²³ In the EU-15, ²⁴ annual production varies between 15 and 18 million MT. ²⁵ Sugar production increased significantly with the entry of the ten new members in May 2004. Of these new member states, six produce sugar, adding approximately 3 million MT to annual sugar production figures for the future.²⁶

[85] In general, imports of the subject goods from the European Union for domestic consumption in Canada have all but ceased since the injury finding. This can be attributed to the high normal values and countervailing duty amounts that are currently in place. CBSA import statistics show that most of the refined sugar being imported from the European Union is non-subject sugar²⁷.

[86] The Tribunal’s dumping order concerns subject goods from Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Lack of response from the exporters at the time of the investigation resulted in dumping margins ranging from 78% to 180%.

[87] The European Union sugar regime guarantees sugar producers in the member countries a price for sugar that is higher than the world price. High import tariffs and production quotas help maintain minimum prices for quota sugar sold within the
European Union. Sugar produced in excess of the domestic quotas must be carried over or sold outside of the European Union at world prices. Since 1993, the guaranteed price paid to sugar processors for refined sugar has been set at EUR 631.9/MT,²⁸ which is three to four times the world price. Since 1995, world market prices have been decreasing, due to an excess of production over consumption.²⁹ The price support programs result in normal values that are significantly higher than the world price. As long as the European Union sugar regime continues to support prices within the European Union, exports of refined sugar from the European Union cannot compete in the Canadian market without dumping.

[88] The four named countries in the dumping order accounted for 45% of the total sugar supplies (stocks, production and imports) of the EU-15 in 2003/04.³⁰ Large producers operate in all four of these countries. Danisco Sugar in Denmark is one of Europe’s largest sugar producers with a production quota of approximately 1 million MT.³¹
Sudzucker, AG, headquartered in Germany, has a 3.8 million MT quota.³² The
largest United Kingdom producer, British Sugar Plc., has a 1.3 million MT quota³³
and Royal Cosun Group in the Netherlands is a beet growers cooperative owned by approximately 14,000 growers.³⁴

[89] Evidence on the administrative record further indicates that the ending stocks of these four countries were approximately 4.4 million MT in 2003/04³⁵, equal to almost
four times the Canadian market. Evidence on the record also indicates that inventory levels have increased approximately 18% since the last expiry review in 2000.³⁶ In the absence of the Tribunal’s orders, an unrestricted Canadian market would once more be open to an even greater volume of dumped imports from these countries.

[90] The United States currently has anti-dumping measures in place against imports of refined sugar from Belgium, France and Germany. While the countries differed in the United States case, the factors taken into consideration are the same as those affecting this decision. The weighted average margins of dumping for these countries were all in excess of 100%, and consequently, imports virtually ceased after the United States anti-dumping measures were put in place. On March 30, 2005, the United States Department of Commerce concluded the second sunset review (expiry review) of this case and found that, on the basis of the factors, “revocation of the anti-dumping duty findings against refined sugar from these countries would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping”. ³⁷

[91] As noted earlier in this report, the CBSA recently completed a reinvestigation to update the amount of subsidy to be applied to all imports of subject sugar from the European Union. This amount is currently set at EUR 51.375 per 100 kilograms, which represents a substantial deterrent to exports from the European Union to Canada. Most of this subsidy is attributable to the export refunds program, which is considered to be a prohibited export subsidy. The export refunds involve direct financial payments to exporters to encourage export sales of production that is surplus to European Union needs. These refunds are intended to cover the difference between the supported European Union price and the world price for sugar.

[92] Ending stocks for the countries that currently comprise the EU-25 were
9.4 million MT in 2003/04³⁸, which is approximately seven times the size of the Canadian market for refined sugar. Stocks are substantial, and, in the absence of the Tribunal’s orders, Canada would be an attractive market for sugar exports.

[93] The United States currently has countervailing duty measures in place against imports of subsidized sugar from the European Union. On March 21, 2005, the
United States Department of Commerce preliminarily found that the revocation of the countervailing duty measures on refined sugar from the European Union would “be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy.” ³⁹ The Department of Commerce further noted that the European Union had not made any substantial changes to its sugar regime during the time the measures had been in place. The United States decision supports an affirmative determination of the likelihood of continued or resumed subsidization in this review.

[94] As noted in the discussion of exports from the United States, widespread government intervention and import restrictions by countries other than Canada make Canada a likely target for dumped and subsidized sugar. Given the European Union sugar surplus and the import restrictions for European Union sugar in other countries, including the United States, there is a very real possibility of diversion of European Union refined sugar exports to Canada, in the absence of the Tribunal’s orders.

[95] Certain aspects of the European Union sugar regime were recently challenged in the WTO. A WTO panel found certain aspects of the European Union sugar regime to be WTO-inconsistent, including illegal cross-subsidization associated with the production and sale for export of quota sugar over and above the domestic quota. The WTO has also recommended that the European Commission be asked to bring its sugar regime in conformity with its obligation under the Agreement on Agriculture.⁴⁰

[96] As part of the CBSA subsidy reinvestigation in 2004, the European Commission noted in its submission that the European Union sugar regime is being revised to reduce the assistance provided to European exporters of refined sugar and consequently reduce the level of subsidization. While the reform proposals include a call for the support price to drop by 33%, this decrease will be phased in over three years, starting in 2005/06.⁴¹ The current quota system is in place until June 2006.⁴² Furthermore, a draft resolution adopted by the European Parliament on March 10, 2005, is critical of proposed reforms and calls for retaining the present price support system.⁴³ While the European Union continues to be under pressure to reform the sugar regime, significant reform is not likely to happen in the near and medium term, thus resulting in dumped and subsidized exports to Canada in absence of the orders.

[97] In conclusion, consideration and analysis of the evidence on the record indicates there is a likelihood that continued or resumed dumping of refined sugar from the
United States, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and subsidizing of refined sugar from the European Union would occur if the orders expire.

[98] An analysis of the price support programs in place in the named countries illustrates that exporters are unable to sell refined sugar to Canada at undumped and/or unsubsidized prices. The low volume of imports into Canada subsequent to the time when SIMA duties were first imposed supports this conclusion. Removal of the orders would allow Canadian importers to take advantage of these low prices. Given the size of the inventories in all of the named countries, Canada, with a lack of import restrictions, would be an attractive target for imports of refined sugar, should the orders be rescinded.

CONCLUSION

[99] For purposes of making a determination in this expiry review, the CBSA conducted its analysis within the scope of the factors set forth in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR. Based on the foregoing consideration of pertinent factors and analysis of evidence on the record, on June 17, 2005, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA, the President determined that the expiry of the orders made by the Tribunal on November 3, 2000, in Review No. RR-99-006, is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods.

FUTURE ACTION

[100] On June 20, 2005, the Tribunal commenced its inquiry to determine whether the expiry of the orders in respect of these goods is likely to result in injury or retardation to the domestic industry. The Tribunal will make its decision by November 2, 2005.

[101] If the Tribunal determines that the expiry of the orders is likely to result in injury or retardation, the orders will be continued in respect of those goods, with or without amendment. If this is the case, the CBSA will continue to levy anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty on dumped importations of the subject goods.

[102] If the Tribunal determines that the expiry of the orders is unlikely to result in injury or retardation, the orders will be rescinded in respect of those goods. Anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty would no longer be levied on importations of the subject goods.

INFORMATION

[103] For further information, please contact Karen Humphries or Ron McTiernan at:

Mail
Canada Border Services Agency
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Directorate
100 Metcalfe Street, 11^th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0L8
Canada

Telephone
Karen Humphries (613) 954-7176
Ron McTiernan (613) 954-7271

Telefax
(613) 948-4844

Email
simaregistry-depotlmsi@cbsa-asfc.gc.ca

Web site
www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/

Pierre Richard
Vice-President
Admissibility Branch

---

APPENDIX

PRODUCT DEFINITION EXCLUSIONS

Exclusions as of November 6, 1995

• Co-crystallized products – For greater clarity, these products are comprised of sugar syrups or liquid sucrose blends and one or more non-sucrose ingredients combined through a co-crystallization process to form a dry solid structure in granulated or powder form.
• Pearl sugar – For greater clarity, pearl sugar is hard granulated sugar, pellet-formed by subjecting sugar syrup to intense heat. The pellet, which is the size of a pea, is shaped like a football.  It is coarser than coarse sugar, i.e., confectioners’ sugar.
• Bottler’s floc-free beet sugar – Imported by McNeil Consumer Products Company for use in pharmaceutical preparations.
• Lyle’s Golden Syrup – Produced by Tate & Lyle PLC.
• Lyle’s Pouring Syrup – Produced by Tate & Lyle PLC.
• Daddy brand wrapped sugar dominoes in 1-kg boxes – For greater clarity, these are sugar cubes which are wrapped in illustrated paper wrappings, each of which contains two sugar cubes.
• Daddy brand wrapped sugar cubes in 5-kg boxes containing 960 portion – For greater clarity, each portion contains two sugar cubes which are wrapped in illustrated paper wrappings.
• Saint Louis brand pre-cut brown cane sugar lumps in 1-kg boxes – For greater clarity, these are rough-shaped sugar lumps comprised of brown cane sugar.
• Daddy brand shaped white sugar pieces in 500-g boxes – For greater clarity, these sugar pieces are pre-cut into diamond, heart, spade and club shapes.
• Daddy brand brown or blond “Vergeoise” sugar in 500-g cases.
• Comptoir du Sud brand brown and white sugar pieces in 1-kg and 500-g boxes.
• Daddy brand brown coffee sugar in 500-g box packets – For greater clarity, this is a large granule brown sugar.
• Demerara sugar cubes – Produced by Tate & Lyle PLC.
• Amber sugar crystals – Produced by Tate & Lyle PLC. For greater clarity, these are large sugar crystals in varying shades of brown.
• Low-colour liquid sucrose with a colour no higher than 10 maximum ICUMSA (International Commission for Uniform Methods of Sugar Analysis) colour units and distiller’s grade liquid sucrose imported by Gilbey Canada Inc. for use as ingredients in its production process.

Additional Exclusions as of November 3, 2000

• Bottler’s floc-free beet sugar imported for use in pharmaceutical preparations where it is established by the importer that floc-free beet sugar from Canadian sources does not meet the applicable product specifications.
• Golden, pouring and other table syrups imported in retail-ready packaging in containers not exceeding 3 litres.
• Subject to the exception below, specialty wrapped sugar cubes, each individual wrapping containing not more than 3 sugar cubes, imported in retail-ready packages not exceeding 5 kg in weight. This exclusion does not include generic wrapped white sugar cubes (i.e., where the illustration consists of primarily a trade-mark, trade name, company name or other commercial identification as opposed to a unique illustration).
• Pre-cut specialty shaped sugar pieces, imported in retail-ready packaging, in packages not exceeding 1 kg in weight – For greater clarity, these include diamond-, heart-, spade- and club-shaped sugar but do not include cube- or domino- (i.e., rectangular) shaped sugar.
• Rough-shaped lumps and pieces, in lumps or pieces weighing between 3 and 10 g on average, imported in retail-ready packaging, in individual packages not exceeding 1 kg in weight.
• Very large crystal sugar, in crystals exceeding 0.05 g in weight on average, imported in retail-ready packaging, in individual packages not exceeding 1 kg in weight.
• Specialty sugar cubes and dominoes (i.e., rectangles), made from demerara, brown, yellow or any other non-white sugar, imported in retail-ready packaging, in packages not exceeding 1 kg in weight – For greater clarity, this does not include any sugar cube or domino made from white granulated sugar.
• Low-colour liquid sucrose with a colour no higher than 10 ICUMSA colour units and distiller’s grade liquid sucrose imported for use in the production of distilled spirits where it is established by the importer that low-colour liquid sucrose and distiller’s grade liquid sucrose from Canadian sources do not meet the applicable product specifications.
• Organic sugar meeting the requirements of the Canadian General Standards Board standard No. CAN/CGSB-32.310-99 (Organic Agriculture), the U.S. Federal Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 or any rules adopted under that act, or the European Union EN2092/94 (Organic Regulation), where it is accompanied by a transaction certificate affirming compliance with the standard signed by an ISO Guide 65 accredited certifying authority.

---

1 Exhibit 9 (NC) Customs Tariff – Schedule.

2 Exhibit 29 (NC) CSI response to ERQ – Appendix A20(a).

3 Ibid, Appendix A19(a).

4 Exhibit 16 (NC) – CBSA Import and Enforcement Statistics for Refined Sugar.

5 Exhibit 51 (NC) – CSI Case Brief, page 10.

6 Ibid, page 11.

7 Ibid, page 21.

8 Ibid, page 24.

9 Exhibit 53 (NC) ASR Case Brief, page 1.

10 Exhibit 47 (NC) ASR Rebuttal Evidence, Attachment Rebuttal-2.

11 Ibid, Attachment Rebuttal-4.

12 Exhibit 29 (NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, Exhibit A23-U.S.(b) (Note: U.S. currency).

13 Exhibit 39 (NC) – United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service: Sugar and Sweetener Policy, Table 2 (Note: U.S. currency).

14 Exhibit 4 – Tribunal Orders and Statement of Reasons (RR-99-006), November 3, 2000, page 16.

15 Exhibit 17 (P) CBSA Import and Enforcement Statistics.

16 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI response to ERQ, page 34, Table 10.

17 STRV – Short tons raw value. One short ton = 0.90718474 MT,

1 STRV * 0.8478 = 1 MT refined sugar.

18 Exhibit 63(NC) – ASR Additional Information, WASDE-422 Report, May 12, 2005.

19 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI response to ERQ, p.34, Table 10.

20 Approximately half of the Canadian market of 1.38 million MT (approximately 1.6 million STRV).

21 Exhibit 18 (P) – Tribunal Pre-hearing Staff Report 2000, Table 51 and Exhibit 20(NC) – CSI Update on Basic Sugar Facts, June 14, 2004, Appendix 28, Table 23.

22 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, page 15, Table 5.

23 Ibid, Appendix A23-EU(j).

24 The EU-15 is comprised of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In 2004, 10 new countries joined the European Union, bringing the number of members to 25 (EU-25). The 10 new countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

25 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, page 41.

26 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, Appendix A23-EU(h).

27 Exhibit 14(NC) – Import Statistics (2002 - 2004).

28 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, Appendix A23-EU(b), page 5.

29 Ibid, Appendix A22(i), page 3.

30 Ibid, Appendices A23-EU(h) and (i).

31 Exhibit 20(NC) – CSI Update on Basic Sugar Facts, June 14, 2004, page 12.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, Appendix A23-EU (g), page 8.

35 Ibid, Appendix A23-EU (i).

36 Ibid, Appendix A23-EU (h).

37 Exhibit 49(NC), Additional Appendices of the CSI, Appendix H, pages 1-2.

38 Exhibit 29(NC) – CSI Response to ERQ, Appendix A23-EU (h).

39 Exhibit 49(NC), Additional Appendices of the CSI, Appendix H, pages 10-16.

40 Exhibit 54(NC) – World Trade Organization, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, AB-2005-2 – Report of the Appellate Body, April 28, 2005.

41 Exhibit 37(NC) – American Sugar Alliance, “EU Sugar Policy Reform and the WTO”, July 15, 2004.

42 Exhibit 41(NC) – Oxfam Briefing Note: “An End to Sugar Dumping?”, August 6, 2004.

43 Exhibit 44(NC) – European Information Service, “Parliament Criticizes EU Sugar Reform Plans”, March 10, 2005.